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CHAPTER I

EFFECTS OF FOREIGN CAPITAL ON THE KOREAN ECONOMY

Introduction
The climate in the Republic of Korea for investment by foreign
nationals has improved greatly in recent years.

The Korean gov

ernment has provided legislation designed to offer distinct
advantages to foreign investors.

In addition, the progress of the

Korean economy over the several years might have provided any such
investors with increasing profits.

On the other hand, foreign in

vestment has assisted the Korean economy with much needed capital
and reduced its chronic unemployment problem.
A major purpose in preparing this report is to provide poten
tial investors with the objectives and goals of the Korean
government, pertinent legislation, and the type of socio-economic
information necessary to an understanding of the Korean business
climate.
Primary and secondary research were conducted in order to de
termine the goals, plans, and programs of the government sector of
the Korean economy for increasing private foreign investment.

In

addition to identifying the goals of the government, an attempt
was made to ascertain its problems in achieving its goals.

Through

personal interviews with government officials and persons from
economic institutions, a general picture of the Korean economy was
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developed.

However, most of the information for this paper was ob

tained from a review of newspapers, economic journals, and
government publications issued mainly by the Economic Planning
Board.
Foreign capital consists of public loans, commercial loans,
foreigner's direct investment, and technological development.
Public loans are usually used for social overhead capital and to
finance public service facilities.

Since public loans are not for

the purpose of earning profits, they will be omitted from this dis
cussion.

Commercial loans consist of cash loans and capital goods

investment, the latter being divided into project loans and non
project loans or program loans.

Project loans are for building

industrial facilities and program loans are made for buying raw
materials.

Cash loans are used for domestic payment of imported in

dustrial products and facilities.
Foreign investors are allowed to invest directly and to par
ticipate in management.
items;

They can invest with any of the following

foreign means of payment or domestic means of payment accrued

from direct exchange, profits accrued from the stocks or shares ac
quired under this law, capital goods, and industrial property rights
or other technology as deemed necessary by the Minister of the
Economic Planning Board.
In Chapter Two, policies used to attract foreign capital are
discussed.

Included are the laws and regulations applicable to

foreign investment.

They are reviewed in detail to illustrate fa

vorable treatment, government guarantees, and restrictions on
foreign investment.

Comparative foreign investments are treated in
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Chapter Three, while in Chapter Four, the various problems created
by foreign investment are identified and discussed.

In Chapter

Five, legislative solutions to the problems are proposed.

Conclu

sions are drawn in Chapter Six.

Historical Development of Foreign Aid to Korea
The Republic of Korea (hereafter called Korea) was one of the
countries which had received large amounts of American aid.

It had

received more than &4.)7 billion in grants during the 24-year period
from 1945 through 1 9 6 8 .^
These relatively large amounts of dollars have been considered
by some persons to be wasted.
debate has resulted.

Within the United States, a major

Nevertheless, American aid has had a great

effect on the Korean economy and has played an important role in
restoring the economy.

For example:

American aid relieved some of the Korean government’s finan
cial difficulties.

Since personal income in Korea was at a very

low level, revenues from taxes were far less than the government’s
needs.

In the 1950's, 40 to 50 percent of the governmental budget

was comprised of counterpart funds, which are the revenues received
from the sale of merchandise given as aid.

2

Until i960 , American aid had accounted for more than I6 per
cent of the gross national product for each of the previous I5

Economic Planning Board, Handbook of Economic Cooperation
(Economic Planning Board Press, I9 6 9 ), p. 110. Also see Korea
Exchange Bank, Monthly Review, March, 1969, Vol. 5, No. 3, p . 13;
and Korea Exchange Bank, Weekly Review, December 3 0 , 1968, Vol. 2,
No. 5 2 , p. 5 3 .
^Korea Exchange Bank, Weekly Review, December 3 0 , 1968, Vol. 2,
No. 5 2 , p. 5 3 .
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years.^

Goods and services imported as a part of aid packages re

lieved the shortage of the necessities of life; they helped the
Korean economy out of its shortage of foreign exchange.

If there

had not been American aid, Koreans would have had to buy the daily
necessities with scarce foreign exchange, which could have put the
economy in a more difficult financial position.
Annual revenues of 20 to 30 billion won ($1,305 equals one
won) from the sales of goods and services helped to prevent infla
tion by withdrawing the notes in circulation and permitted economic
growth.

4

On the other hand, counterpart funds became the main

source of financing for industry.

This replenished the national

savings, increased the rate of investment, and played an important
role in continuous economic development.
After World War II, the United States provided large amounts
of aid to countries all over the world.

The aid rescued disease-

stricken and hungry people, rehabilitated war-torn nations, and
helped economic development in developing countries.

Besides these

humanitarian and economic aspects, aid was an important measure in
maintaining security of countries fighting Communism.

It was for

these purposes that the United States contributed most of its aid
under liberal repayment conditions.

However, because of the in

creasingly unfavorable international balance of payments condition,
which began in 1957, the United States has reduced the magnitude of
aid, and its foreign aid policy has been changed.

Grants-in-aid

^Ibid., Table 6, p. 9*
4

Ibid., Table 8, p. 10.
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assistance was shifted to development loans.

5

Accordingly, Korea

had a reduction in the amount in grants as loans were increased.
Foreign aid declined from $352.1 million in 195& to $109.0 million
in 1 9 6 7 .

In 1 9 6 8 , it increased to $14?.0 million.

However, the in

crease was largely caused by the increase in Development Loan Funds
and imports of grain surplus due to the failure of crops in 196?
and 1 9 6 8 .^

Foreign grants are expected to be discontinued during

the 1 9 7 0 's.

Financial pressure resulted from the reduced foreign

aid, and Korea's balance of payments became unfavorable since most
of the daily necessities and raw materials had to be bought with
Korean foreign exchange.

The gap between savings and investment

became greater as the amount of foreign aid declined.

The situa

tion further deteriorated because of a series of Five-Year Economic
Development Plans started in I96I .

In addition, the amount of in-

vestable savings was small because of the low level of income.
Any economic development plans would have to be financed through
foreign loans.
Foreign aid has played an important role in the development of
the Korean economy.

However, grant aid has been less effective

than foreign loans because grants have been controlled by the con
tributors whereas foreign loans have been used as the borrowers'
needs dictated.

From the point of view of efficiency, therefore,

the conversion from grants to loans has actually brought a great
boost to the Korean economy.

^Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, "American Aid,"
Economic Prospect and Problems in New Year, (Seoul, I9 6 8 ), p. 206.
^Economic Planning Board, Handbook of Economic Cooperation,
(Economic Planning Board Press, 19^9), p « 110.

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

6
After this major turning point in the 1960's, the Korean gov
ernment implemented a policy to make a type of ’'artificial"
progress with foreign and domestic savings rather than expecting
self-generated economic growth provided by grant aid.

This effort

began in the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan started
during 1962.

It was the first step of a comprehensive development

plan designed to attain a self-supporting economy.

As a long-range

plan, the Korean government intends to set up a series of fiveyear

economic development plans.

sums

of

These plans will require large

capital beyondKorea's internal

capacity for generation.

Accordingly, policies designed to attract foreign capital for
economic growth and development will receive high priority.

Effects of Foreign Capital on Korea
It may be helpful
capital to demonstrate

in understanding the significance of foreign
how such capital contributes to the economy

of a developing country.
Grant aid often is not considered by receiving countries as
being either sufficient in amount, or of the proper composition, or
being received at the most appropriate time.

Grant aid is gener

ally extended and controlled in accordance with the economic and
political situation of the aiding country.

In recent years, a

donor country's foreign aid policy has been closely related to its
export policy.

On the other hand, most foreign capital import

policies are formulated by the importing country.

They plan how

to use foreign capital so as to maximize its effects.
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Generally, developing countries face various problems at the
time they set economic development plans.

The major problems are:

the low level of capital accumulation, low productivity, low indi
vidual income, low level of investment resulting from the small
amount of capital accumulated, underexploitation of resources, lack
of technical skills, and a relatively large population combined
with an expanding or high birth rate.

The function of foreign

capital is to fill the gap between needs and availability of capital
for investment in a developing country.

In other words, foreign

capital has the direct effect of bringing a faster rate of develop
ment by providing capital and technology to a developing country.
The direct effects discussed previously are only short-term
effects to relieve bottlenecks to production.
long-run effect on production.

They also have a

When applied to production, they

increase income and effective demand.

This increases investment

again and will induce the "multiplier effect."

The multiplier is

determined by the degree of marginal propensity to consume.

The

consumer index in Korea shows that the average MPC from 1962
through 1967 was 88 percent.^

By applying the MFC of .88 to the

multiplier formula, the following multiplier can be obtained:

k = - p T l W = 8.33
Thus, a million dollars of foreign capital to be invested in the
Korean economy may increase the gross national product by $8.33
million.

Of course, this effect is a description of the

^Economic Planning Board, Economic Survey. (Seoul, 1 9 6 8 ),
p. 1 9 7 .
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simultsineous multiplier effect.

It will take a relatively long

time to see the full multiplier effect and continuous investment
will be necessary every year to get a continuous multiplier effect
of 8 ,3 3 thereafter.
Theoretically, some extent of acceleration will occur when
effective demand is increased by foreign capital.

However, the

Korean economy is not in a position to produce capital goods in re
sponse to increases in effective demand.

Capital formation can be

realized mainly through additional transfusion of foreign capital.
Therefore, any acceleration effect may be negligible.
Expecting the full effects described above, the Korean govern
ment is making strenuous efforts to attract foreign capital.
However, not all foreign capital helps economic progress.
types do nothing but accelerate the consumption rate.
help the economy progress faster.

Some

Other types

Taking these situations into

account, the Korean government has established certain criteria for
attracting more effective types and greater quantities of foreign
capitauL.

The government has several objectives to achieve through

its policies and programs.
First, it wants to maintain a high level of capital formation
and attain continuous progress toward a higher level of economic
activity.

The economy maintained a 9.1 percent average economic

growth rate through the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan
Sind achieved higher rates of growth (13*4 percent, 8.9 percent, sund
g

1 3 .1 percent) from 1966 through 1968, respectively.

In 1969, the

Q
Korea Exchange Bank, Monthly Review, March, 1969, Vol. 3»
No. 3, p. 1 9 <
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government boasted the world's highest rate of economic growth at
15*9 percent.

9

The growth was primarily attributable to the high

rate of capital formation which has resulted largely from an influx
of foreign capital.

The contribution rate of foreign capital to

total capital formation increased from 2.6 percent in 1962 to 2 6 .8
percent in 196?.^®
Second, the government wants to modernize industry.

The First

Five-Year Economic Development Plan provided the impetus for the
industrialization of the Korean economy.

Due to the foreign capital

which has been used to develop the second and third industries, the
industrial structure was greatly improved along with a quantitative
expansion of the economy.

Proportions of GNP for the primary,

second, and third industries have changed from 4l.4, l$.l, and 43«5
percent, respectively, in I960 to 2 8 .0 , 21.4, and $0.6 percent in
1 9 6 8 .^^

Intensive investment was made to overcome the shortage of

social overhead capital.

The main concern of the government is to

develop industry, where the social overhead capital is sui indispen
sable factor for industrialization.
Third, the Korean government wants to improve the balance of
payments.

Foreign capital is important not only for its function

as a fund for development but also as a mechanism to improve the

^News Week, July 27, 1970, p. 34.
^^Division of Foreign Exchange, Foreign Exchange Beuok, The
Present Situation and Problems of Foreign Capital Inducement,
(Seoul, 1 9 6 9 ).
^^Korea Exchange Bank, Monthly Review, March, 1969» Vol. 3»
No. 3, p. 20.
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international balance of payments.

According to a 1968 survey fi

nanced by foreign investors, 4$ companies created a $350 million
import substitution effect and exported $78 million.

Also of im

portance were changes in the composition of exports due to foreign
capitaul.

In I96O, the export of industrial goods was less than 1?

percent.

Most of the exports consisted of raw materials or agri

cultural products.

After eight years, industrial goods now account

for 76 percent of exports.

This reflects the Korean government's

desire to improve the international balance of payments through the
exportation of industrial products.

12

Fourth, the government is attempting to cultivate entrepre
neurship and scientific management.

One of the most important

economic effects of foreign capital is the changed attitudes of
businessmen.

Korea has trained many entrepreneurs.

Their atti

tudes toward making profits through scientific management have
brought about a revolution in Korean management.

Even though there

is not much direct investment as yet, foreign investors have intro
duced modern management techniques to local businessmen.

As an

inevitable consequence, local businessmen no longer expect to
operate a company for windfall profits, but rather they are trying
to find new products, new methods of production, new markets, and
new forms of organization.
Finally, the government wants to increase employment and tech
nical development.

Foreign capital is used to build factories and

to create employment opportunities for local people.

As industriali

zation progresses, it absorbs the unemployed and potential unemployed

l^ibid.
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in agricultural districts.

On the other hand, foreign investors

introduced new techniques eind equipment which help to increase pro
ductivity.
The preceding chapter has dealt with the various effects of
foreign capital on the Korean economy.

The next chapter will be

concerned with the role of government and governmental policies
toward the overall development of the country.

These policies will

be examined from the standpoints of flexibility, effectiveness, and
timeliness.
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I I

FOREIGN CAPITAL INDUCEMENT LAWS AND REGULATIONS

The Foreign Capital Inducement Law
Foreign capital inducement in Korea is provided for by legis
lation through the Foreign Capital Inducement Law.

Foreign

investors, while receiving considerate treatment, are restricted
and supervised according to the law.

The law is a guide for gov

ernment officials to control foreign capital.

The law, however,

does not guarantee the same treatment for all forms of foreign
capital.

Those types of capitail considered "harmful" are discour

aged through administrative measures and less urgent types are
restricted by applying complicated conditions for their entry.

On

the other hand, if foreign capital is considered indispensable to
the development of the economy, the government treats it with
special consideration.
The foreign capital inducement policy has changed in accord
ance with the economic policy of the nation.

Since economic policy

is outlined in the Long-Range Economic Development Plain, it is
easier to understand the far reaching economic policy if the tairgets
and directions of the government's long-range economic development
plan are known.
A series of Five-Year Plans will be implemented until an
adequately high level of economic development has been attained.
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The third, fourth, and fifth plans are currently under considera
tion and plans are being made to introduce foreign capital based
upon the urgency and necessity of such capital for the successful
accomplishment of economic plans.

Even though the emphasis will be

placed in different areas as conditions dictate, the basic elements
of the long-range strategy and objectives will not be changed sig
nificantly throughout the plans.
the Second Plan.

The objectives are stipulated in

The basic objectives of long-range strategy are

to expand exports, increase capital, auxd improve efficient manpower
utilization.
The promotion of industrialization through the expansion of
exports is an inevitable path for the economy to follow.

A rela

tively unfavorable endowment of natural resources imposes on the
economy the necessity of being an open economy.

It would also be

difficult to offer the domestic market alone as the foundation for
expanded industrial production in view of the size of the economy.
Another reason exports are emphasized is the low level of capital
accumulation.

Because of this, and for more efficient development,

foreign borrowing is inevitable.

However, foreign loans, them

selves, may not be available without the foundation of a leirge
export capacity.
Foreign loans, per se, are not enough to develop the economy
appropriately.
machinery.

Usually foreign capital is used for importing

To build a factory, land is necessary.

plant, operating capital must be provided.

To operate the

It is very important

for the economy to provide these funds while at the same time
avoiding inflation.

For these reasons, developing the capital
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market, especially the stock market, is one of the government's
major concerns.
It is often said in Korea that the greatest resource of Korea
is its people.

Large numbers of well-educated people and highly-

skilled workers are willing to work for relatively low wages and
salaries.

Korea has a low rate of illiteracy of less than 10 per

cent of its population.

Most of the workers, except for farmers,

have acquired at least a high school education.
diligent and fast learners.

The people are

However, there are not enough jobs to

put all of these laborers to work.

It is therefore mandatory that

any economic measure fully utilize the human resources.

It is

essential that development plans give emphasis to those industries
which are labor-intensive and those which require high productivity
per worker.

The electronics and textile industries are represen

tative of such labor-intensive production.
It is also important to develop industries which will stimu
late the growth of related industries as well as labor intensive
industries in order to increase the levels of employment and in
come.

Furthermore, it is necessary to construct key industries

such as chemicals, iron and steel, and machinery manufacturing in
order to establish the foundation for heavy industry which will,
in turn, provide for the balanced development of industry in the
future.

Such industrial development should bring about a diversi

fication of commodities and increase effective demand through
subsequent development in related industries.

Furthermore, it

should increase the GNP and strengthen Korea's international com
petitive position.

The government is now planning for the
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construction of new plants and the expansion of existing facilities
for the production of industrial machinery, heavy agricultural
equipment and machinery, communication equipment, automobiles,
ships, eind transportation equipment,^
One of the most severe problems facing the Korean economy lies
in the differences in income between city and rural districts.

Dis

trict differences between urban communities and rural districts can
be seen vividly.

People leave the rural areas and seek jobs in the

cities, especially in Seoul, the capital of Korea.

Mobility leaves

the countryside deserted and underdeveloped in many areas.

Pro

fessor Ghin-whan Park of Seoul Agricultural College pointed out
that "Korean agriculture fell into a snare of low level of balance
of sluggish demand and limited supply," which seems to imply that
a low level of deaand for Korean grain has resulted from foreign
grain imports and limited supply caused by low productivity have
prevented rural districts from developing.

2

The failure of the farming community has suppressed economic
progress in general.

First, the farmers' relatively low income

levels have restricted the market for goods and services produced
and prevented the economy from taking advantage of mass production,
which further resulted in higher unit production costs.

In addi

tion, farmers could not provide abundant raw materials which then
must be imported at higher prices.

As a result, the cost of

products has risen and weakened Korea's competitive standing in the

^Government of the Republic of Korea, The Second Five-Year
Economic Development Plan; 1967-1971. (SeouTT"l9^i5T!
^The Dong-A Daily, June 26, 1969, P* 4.
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world markets.

On the other hand, the drain of foreign exchemge

resulted from raw material imports aggravated the international
balance of payments.

To cope with these difficulties in the agri

cultural field, a concerted effort by the government is expected to
be initiated soon.

Agricultural development policy will be aimed

toward self-support in food production, saving foreign exchange,
and increasing farmers' incomes through dairy production and the
3
marketing of other by-products.
As the economy grows and as its proportion of industry becomes
larger, it will be necessary to transfer some farm labor to
factories.

To prepare for this end, mechanization of agriculture

is proceeding.

Also, a heavy agricultural equipment end machinery

development plan is under consideration.
Development of techniques for production is no less important
than the accumulation of capital as regards the process of develop
ment.

This has been demonstrated by the more advanced countries.

J. A. Schumpeter considers such techniques as an independent
factor of economic development, and he has contended that economic
development cannot be realized without developing new products,
new means of production, new markets, new raw materials, and new
forms of management organization.

According to Schumpeter, ad

vanced countries develop their economies through continuous inven
tion by inventors and innovations for production by businessmen,
and so should developing countries through imitating such innova
tions.

The most important strategy for developing the economy of

^Federation of Korean Industries, Reformation of Economic Con
stitution for International Competition! (Seoul, December, 19^0),
p • 2ft
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a developing country is to follow the example of an advanced country,
i. e., to introduce their proven techniques.

Growth of the Japanese

economy is a typical case of economic success through introducing
highly advanced techniques from some other more advanced country.^
The Korean economy accomplished a high rate of growth through
the First and the Second Economic Development Plans.

However, the

expanded exports and domestic eind foreign savings were mainly re
sponsible for this fast growth.

The growth has not been led by

technical development as in more advanced countries.

This is

partly due to a failure to introduce new techniques.

Although late

to act on this problem, the government has now begun to pay more
attention to technological inducement by preparing "Plans for
Authorization of Technological Inducement" through the Foreign
Capital Inducement Law.
As the Second Plan nears its end, the Economic Planning Board
of Korea has disclosed an outline of its Third Plan scheduled to
begin in 1972.

There is not much change in direction eind contents

of economic policies from that of the Second Plan.

Rather, the

direction of the policy for attracting capital seems to follow that
of the Second Plan.

In the Third Plain, the need to export is more

strongly emphasized aind steady economic growth is called for rather
than a high rate of economic growth.

In May, 1 9 6 9 , the Economic

Planning Board released the outline of the Third Plan setting an
annual growth rate for the GNP at 10 percent and an export goal for
^Korea Excheinge Bank, Weekly Review. April 2 8 , I9 6 9 , Vol. 3t
No. 1 7 , pp. 3-5*
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the last year of the plam at $2.8 billion.^

The board revised the

guide and released the finauL draft on November 27, 1969»

In this

revision, the annual growth rate of GNP was decreased from 10 per
cent to 8.5 percent, and the target export figure for the Third
Plan was increased to $5.5 billion.^
To attain the established target figures, the following
strategies were outlined in the Third Plan:
1.

To mechanize agriculture to attain self-support of food

stuffs, and to increase the incomes of farmers and fishermen.
2.

To accelerate industrialization through facilitating de

velopment of heavy industry.
3.

To maximize employment and promote productivity through

the rapid improvement of scientific technology and the reinforce
ment of technicsil training.
4.

To balance the development of social overhead capital in

all fields:

electricity, transportation, storage, loading and un

loading facilities, communications, and so forth.
5.
dustries.

To develop collective factory sites for use by import in7

Additional Laws and Regulations on Foreign Investment
The main controlling factor for foreign capital entering
Korea is the Foreign CapitaüL Inducement Law of 1965.

From the

^The Dong-A Daily. May 6, 1969* p. 2.
^The Hankook Daily, November 2?, 1969, p . 2.
7-Ibid.
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date of passage of the law, many articles and clauses have been
added, rescinded, and revised.

To facilitate understanding the

law, processes and reasons for the chemges aire described below.
For the purpose of attracting foreign capital, the government
enacted the Foreign Investment Encouragement Law on January 1,
19 6 0 .

This law was reinforced with others, namely, the Basic

Policy for Controlling Foreign Capital, established in December,
1 9 6 1 , and the Program of Foreign Investment Promotion for Non-Project
Loans, passed in June, I962.

These laws were passed because dif

ficulties were found in the area of commercial loans on long-term
deferred payments.

Through these laws, the government stressed the
o

benefits to be derived by foreign investors.
To confirm the preferential treatment to be given foreign in
vestors, the government proclaimed two rules on July 31» 1962:

the

Law on Payment Guarantee of Loans and Special Measures Law on In
ducement of Capital Goods under Long-Term Settlement Basis.

The

former defined government guarantees for redemption of foreign
capital invested, and, the latter embodied the long-term deferred

9

payment.

The policy for attracting foreign capital was changed to a
restrictive direction when the balance of payments situation de
teriorated from bad to worse toward the end of I9 6 2 .

In February,

Q
Economic Planning Board, Economic Survey, 1968. (Economic
Planning Board Press, 1968), p. 1.
^Economic Planning Board, A System for Foreign Capital Inducement and Its Actual Condition, (Economic Planning Board Press,
1 9 6 9 ), p. 22.
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196), the Administration of Application for Non-Project Loans was
published.

It gave priority to public loans and restricted private

commercial loans.
In March, 1964, the Economic Ministers Committee passed their
Policy for Private Commercial Loan Promotion, which broadened the
contents and objectives defined in the above administrative
policy.
In February, 196), the Korean-American Joint Investment Com
mittee was established for the purpose of jointly evaluating the
terms of loans and degree of urgency of commercial loans.

Short

term and high interest loans were restricted while long-term and
low interest public loans as well as direct investment were en^ 12
couraged.
Through a series of revising and adding to the volume-oriented
old laws and rules, the government passed the Foreign Capital
Inducement Law of 1966.

At the same time, the government permitted

banks to guarantee foreign capital against repatriation in order
to assure the smooth inflow of foreign investment.
After the new law was enacted, the restrictive policy was con
tinued for the purpose of carefully selecting loans on the basis of
technical and economic appropriateness.

However, foreign loans

l^Ib i d ., p. 23.
l^Ibid., p. 24.

l^Ibid.
^^Economic Planning Board, Economic Survey, 1968, (Economic
Planning Board Press, 1968), p. 2.
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increased rapidly.

Though these loans contributed to rapid economic

growth, they also created problems.
rapidly.

Foreign debts had increased

Foreign exchange increased the amount of currency suad in

flation increased.

The balainced development between various

industries was checked.

To solve these problems, the government

announced a Comprehensive Policy for Rationalization of Foreign
Capital Inducement.

This policy which was announced in December,

1 9 6 7 » was enacted to control capital inducement so as to import
only appropriate foreign capital which would assist in achieving
the economic development plan.

14

The Foreign Investment Encouragement Law, the Law on Payment
Guarantee of Loams, and the Special Measures Law on Inducement of
Capital Goods under Long-Term Settlement Basis were abrogated on
the effective date of the Foreign Capital Inducement Law.

15

The laws and rules concerning foreign capital were changeable
until after the Foreign Capital Inducement Law was passed.

Since

the economic society was unsettled, and the supply amd demand for
foreign exchange fluctuated so much, these laws were short-lived
and suffered frequent changes.

Some small changes in present laws

and rules are expected; however, the transitional period seems to
be passed and the economy is stabilizing.
Present laws and rules provide generous treatment and guaran
tees to attract certain types of foreign capital.

However, not all

14
^Ibid.
^^Economic Planning Board, Foreign Capital Inducement Law,
(Economic Planning Board Press, 1966;; p. 23.
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foreign capital enjoys the same treatment.

The government would

rather ban those forms which axe not conducive to economic develop
ment.

The present investment laws can be categorized into three

major euresis:

favorable treatment, guarantees, and restrictions.

Favorable treatment.

According to the Foreign Capital Induce

ment Law of 1 9 6 6 , direct investors can enjoy such favorable
treatment as tax exemptions, full foreign ownership, reinvestment
of dividends and repatriation of capital.
1.

The income tax on unincorporated enterprises, the corpora

tion tax on incorporated enterprises, and the property tax and
property acquisition tax on foreign invested enterprises shall be
exempt in total or part as follows:

First, income tax, corpora

tion tax, and property tax shall not be assessed for five years
from the first taxable dates under respective laws, and property
acquisition tax shsQ.1 not be assessed for five years from the
date of registration of title transfer or asset revaluation.
Second, for all these tax:es, fifty percent of the tax amount com
puted under pertinent tax laws shall be exempt for three years
following the expiration of the period stated in the preceding
statement
Taxes to be imposed upon dividends and surplus distribution
accruing from the stocks or shares subscribed to under this law
by a foreign investor shall be exempt in total or part as follows:
Taxes shall not be assessed for five years from the date on which

p. 8.
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the enterprise concerned commenced its business operations.

Fifty

percent of the tax amount computed under the Income Tax Law shall
be exempt for three years following expiration of the period stated
17
previously. ’
Exemptions are made according to the proportion of the stocks
or shares owned by the foreign investors to the total outstanding
stocks of the enterprises.

That is, in cases of joint investment,

tax exemptions are made only for the part owned by the foreign in
vestors.
Customs duty and commodity taxes on capital goods imported
under the authorization of the law shall not be assessed.

*1 A

Since

the law defines as capital goods those parts, accessories to be
used in industrial facilities, raw materials, and other reserves
necessary for an initial six months, customs duty and commodity
taxes are exempt like other machinery and equipment.

19

Even after

the tax exemption period, accessories of facilities, parts,
supplies, and industrial facilities are treated as special imports
when the Minister of Commerce and Industry recognizes that they are
necessary.

20

As in other developing countries, rates of customs

duties and commodity taxes in Korea are very high.
fore, of considerable benefit to escape

It is, there

these taxes.

l^Ibid., p. 9.

^^Korea Exchange Bemk, Monthly Review, December, 1969, Vol. 3,
No. 2, p. 43«
^^Economic Planning Board, Investment Guide to Korea, (Samhwa
Printing Company), p. 33«
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For export enterprises, the total business tax is exempt, fifty
percent of all income and corporate taxes are exempt, and the trade
rebate system is enforced as well.

Therefore, if a foreign company

is engaging in the export business, it can enjoy the above exemp
tions even after the expiration date of the other tax exemptions.
Tax exemptions referred to above may be withheld if the foreign
investor or foreign invested enterprise so requests.

21

This clause

is provided in order to avoid the double imposition of the tax when
tax agreements are reached with the investing countries.
Besides these exemptions, and exemption from customs duty on im
ports of equipment was also introduced.

If an enterprise with

foreign investment engages in the electronic appliances industry
within a bonded area, duty is exempt on the supplies when the
Minister of Commerce and Industry so recommends.
2.

22

Foreign enterprises and foreign investors shall, unless

otherwise specifically prescribed by law, receive the same treat
ment as nationals of Korea in all activities including business
management.

23

Most developing countries do not recognize more

than fifty percent ownership of stock by foreigners for fear that
they might control the economy as a whole.

But the Koreaua govern

ment allows unlimited ownership of shares for foreign investors.
In other words, a business organization can be established with
21.Economic Planning Boeird, Foreign Capital Inducement L aw.
(Economic Planning Board Press: 1966;, p. 9«
^^Korean Trade News. February 26, 19&9.
^^Foreign Capital Inducement Law, p. 9-
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entirely foreign capital investment.

In the case of joint ventures,

it is a basic policy of the government to let questions of the ratio
of shares be deliberated and settled between each partner of the
respective joint venture.

2k

When a foreign investor possesses more

than fifty-one percent ownership, he can manage the business and is
free to utilize the profits from such business activities as he
wishes.
3.

A foreign investor msiy reinvest dividends accrued from

stocks or shares owned by him in the same or other foreign invested
enterprises up to the amount of his original investment.
4.

25

The Foreign Exchange Management Law provides that foreign

capital may be released if the beneficiary so desires after the
business has been established as scheduled and has been running
smoothly.

26

Foreign investors are, thus, released from restric

tions set by the laws concerning foreign capital.
In addition to the foregoing investment benefits granted to
direct investors, preferential treatment is also given to project
foreign creditors, i.e., those who contract with local investors.
For example, income tax on unincorporated enterprises or cor
poration tax on incorporated enterprises are not assessed upon the
interest or other income accruing to lenders from cash loan con
tracts or capitsQ. goods investment contracts.

The above taxes

2k

Economic Planning Board, Questions and Answers for Your In
vestment in Korea, p. 5*
^^Foreign Capital Inducement Law, pp. 5-6.
26

Economic Planning Board, Handbook of Economic Cooperation,
1 9 6 7 , p. 2 5 1 .
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imposed upon remuneration paid to a person or corporate entity pro
viding technology under a technological investment contract shall
be exempt, in total or in part as follows:

Such taxes shall not be

assessed for five years from the date on which technology is intro
duced.

Also, fifty percent of the tax amount computed under the

pertinent tax law shall be exempt for three years following the
expiration date of the above period.

27

These tax exemptions may

be withheld also in paxt or in whole if a lender providing tech
nology so requests.

Guarantees
As another means of attracting foreign capital, the Korean
government provides various guarantees to foreign creditors.

Gen

erally, these guarantees involve the government's backing of credit
transactions with its own assets and taxing powers.

They are sim

ilar to general obligation liabilities of the states, counties, or
municipal corporations in the United States.

In some cases, the

government acts through the Korean Foreign Exchange Bank and, in
others, through commercial banks to make gueurantees.
common types of guarantees are:

The most

guarantees on property invested

by foreigners, repatriation of capital subscriptions, remittance
of dividends, and repayment guarantees on loans and capital goods
investments.
1.

Each of these guarantees is discussed below:
According to Article l4 of the Foreign Capital Investment

Law of 1 9 6 6 , all property of foreign invested enterprises shall be
27

Foreign Capital Inducement Law, p. 11.
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pQ
guaranteed in accordance with the various laws and decrees.
Accordingly, the properties are guaranteed in accordance with the
Requisition Law, the Law of Compensation for Requisition, and the
Law of Expropriation of Land.

The Foreign Capital Inducement Law

is interpreted to observe international treaties concluded and promulgated by Korea.

29

On November 7» 1957» a Treaty of Comity,

Commerce amd Navigation, was concluded between the United States
and Korea.

On February 19» I960, an Investment Security Treaty

was signed between the two countries.

According to the terms of

the latter treaty, the United States government is to provide com
pensation for investment losses due to war.

It is to give compen

sation to American investors and take over the claims.

According

to the terms of the former treaty, people and properties of both
countries are continuously protected, especially patents and trade
marks are under protection by the "national treatment" clause and
the "most favored nation" clause.
Further guarantees are available through the United States
Agency for International Development.

The Specific Risk Invest

ment Guarantee Program of AID insures new investment in Korea by
providing entire coverage against loss due to expropriation,
nationalization, or confiscation by the foreign government.

It

also provides coverage against damage to tangible property as a

Z^ibid., p. 8.
^^Ibid., p. 20.
^^Korea Productivity Center, Business Management. February,
1968, Vol. 120, p. 41.
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result of war, revolution, or insurrection.

The Extended Risk

Guarantee Program of AID can cover up to 75 percent of investments
in foreign private projects agednst losses due to all types of risks
with the exception of fraud or misconduct by the investors.

At the

option of investors, the portion of the investment not covered by
the Extended Risk Guarantee may be insured against political risk
under the Specific Risk Guarantee Program.
2.

A foreign investor maiy sell stocks or shares owned by him.

The overseas remittance of sales proceeds shall be guaranteed up to
20 percent of the capital subscription amount every year after two
years from the date on which the enterprise concerned commences
its business operations.

However, this restriction is not appli

cable in cases where the remittance overseas of proceeds resulting
from the liquidation of the enterprise is permitted by the Minister
of the Economic Planning Board.

32

Therefore, foreign investors,

if they desire, can recover their whole investment in five years.
3.

The remittance overseas of profit dividends accrued from

the stock or shares owned by foreign investors is guaranteed in
accordance with a presidential decree.
also available through AID.

33

Further guarantees are

The Specific Insurance Guarantee Pro

gram of AID provides entire coverage against the inability to

^^Economic Planning Board, Questions amd Answers for Your In
vestment in Korea, p. 10.
^^Foreign Capital Inducement Law, p. 8.
^^Ibid.. p. 7.
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convert actual profits, earnings, or the return of original capital
into dollars."^
4.
guarantee.

There is no more secure guarantee than a governmental
The government, to facilitate inducement of foreign

capital for industries, may guargintee repayments for overseas obli
gations incurring from caish loan contracts or capital goods induce
ment contracts for projects coming under any of the following areas:
projects belonging to "key industry" sectors, projects belonging to
agricultural or fishing sectors, or projects producing commodities
or services, including transportation, essential for national
living.
The remittance abroad of the principal and interest under a
cash loan contract, interest under a capital goods inducement con
tract, or similar values under a technological inducement contract
shall be guaranteed according to the contents of the authorization
concerned.

The sum of the annual repayment allowable (deducting

advance payments, if any) from a cash loan contract or a capital
goods investment contract shall be decided by dividing the amount
of repayment yet to be made by the number of remaining years (deducting grace periods, if any).

37

Most of these remittances,

except those guaranteed by the government, are guaranteed by com
mercial banks.
34
35

However, since all commercial bank guarantees sure

Questions and Answers for Your Investment in Korea, p. 10.
Foreign Capital Inducement Law, p. 12.

^^Ibid.. p. 10.
5?Ibid.. p. 26.
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made through a government-owned bank, the Korea Exchange Bank, they
enjoy double guarantees.

Restrictions
Most developing countries have been concerned about economic
control by other countries since they have been under colonial pol
icies for long periods of time.

Economists try to attract foreign

capital but they hope the local businessmen control enterprises and
foreigners share profits.
Some foreign capital only increases consumption and has a neg
ative effect on saving, both of which undermine capital accumula
tion.

This situation also causes a deterioration in the international

balance of payments since foreign exchange is used for imports of
consumer goods.
Restrictions are established to regulate these undesirable
types of capital inflow.

The restrictions placed by the Korean

government are a little different from those of other developing
countries.

The government does not care who manages the firm as

long as it contributes to economic development and a favorable
balance of payments.

This attitude is demonstrated by the govern

ment by allowing complete ownership by foreign investors.

In

other countries, restrictions may be placed on the type of busi
ness operated, the eimount of investment, overseas remittance of
profits, eind use of foreign employees.

Other countries indicate

the proportion of locally produced parts to be used for production.^

^^Korea Exchange Bank, Weekly Review, May 26, 19&9, Vol. 3,
No. 21, p. 27.
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The most common restrictions instituted by the Korean government
are;

restrictions on the objectives of investors, restrictions on

the repatriation of capitail subscriptions, restrictions on the dis
position of foreign capital, scope of applications of foreign
capital, restrictions on the ownership of real estate, responsi
bilities to open the company to the public, and suspension of
operations during periods of emergency.

Each of these restrictions

is discussed below;
1.

To prevent unwanted foreign capital, the investment made

by foreigners is limited to foreign means of payment or domestic
means of payment accrued from direct exchange thereof, profits
accrued, capital goods, and industrial property rights or other
technology as deemed necessary.
2.

39

Except in the case of the liquidation of an enterprise,

the sale proceeds of stocks or sheures owned by foreign investors
cannot be remitted before two years from the date on which the en
terprise commences its business operations, and even after that,
only 20 percent of the capital subscription aunount can be sent
home every year.

This measure is taken to provide for sufficient

funds which might be needed if foreign investors simultaneously
withdrew their investments.
3.

If a foreign investor wants to use his capital for pur

poses other than those authorized, he must obtain prior permission
from the Minister of the Economic Planning Board.

ifO

Some

39 Foreign Capital Investment Law, p. 6 ,

^Ibid., p. 8 .
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investors want to transfer their capital to businesses other than
those authorized, while still enjoying privileges afforded to
foreign capital.

Local businessmen maiy be subjected to unfair com

petition if this condition is allowed to exist.

At the same time,

the government has the responsibility to prevent funds from being
diverted to sin unwanted form of investment or to an industry pro
moting consumption only.
4.

Trade with communist countries is prohibited.

Based on

this regulation, Korea is not allowed to attract foreign capital
from a nationsQ. or country which does not maintain normal diplo
matic relations with the Republic of Korea, except when a project
is considered particularly necessary for the development of the
national, economy.
3«

4l

Foreign investors are allowed to acquire real estate, in

cluding land.

However, in the case of land acquisition in his own

personal name, the investor should have prior approval from rele
vant authorities under a specific law governing land acquisition
for foreigners.
6.

42

Government-guaranteed enterprises are required to open

the companies to the general public after five years from the date
of commencing operations.

43

A foreign loan enterprise or foreign

invested company is considered to have higher credit than the other

^^Ibid., p. 3.
Questions and Answers for Your Investment in Korea, p. 5»
Lx

Foreign Exchange Bank of Korea, Monthly Review, October,
1 9 6 7 , Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 24.
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domestic companies.

It is the government's intention to foster

capital markets by listing the stocks of those companies.
7.

According to Article 7 of the Foreign Exchange Law, the

Minister of Finance can order the suspension of a foreign exchange
Lk
payment when an emergency arises at home or abroad.
The order is
interpreted as being able to stop the remittsince of foreign capital
and profits.

However, it is only a temporary ban.

Normalization

will be restored as soon as the emergency is ended.
In this chapter, it has been shown that in order to attain
rapid economic growth, the Korean government has opened the economy
to foreign investors and has provided them with various favors and
guarantees.

However, the government has placed some restrictions

in order to utilize foreign capital more efficiently and to maxi
mize the contribution rate of the capital to economic development
by allocating it to industries most urgently needing funds.

kk

Economic Planning Board, Handbook of Economic Cooperation,
1 9 6 9 , (Economic Planning Board Press, 19^9), P» 301.
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CHAPTER III

COMPARATIVE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN KOREA

Public and Private Loans
Despite the current policies of the Korean government which
stress a more moderate growth, the amount of foreign capital in
troduced has increased rapidly from 1959 through 1969.

Especially

with regard to private loans, amounts have increased from $1.9
million in 1962 to $623.7 million in 1969.^

The increase is

largely the result of an improved investment climate in Korea
which helped to win the confidence of foreign investors.

Tables

1 through 4, pages 35 -5 8 provide data about the sources and amounts
of foreign investment in Korea.
The United States had the largest investment in Korea with
$9 7 0 .0 million, or 39 percent of total foreign capital investment
through 1970; Japan was second with $519.5 million, 21 percent;
West Germany vas third with $226.9, 9 percent; and all other
countries invested $759.5 million, 31 percent.
An analysis shows the major characteristics of the foreign
capital attracted to Korea.

For exajjçle, the government now tries

to introduce more direct investment since these do not force re
patriation of principal and interest during difficult financial
times.

However, direct investment represents only 5.7 percent of

^Korea Exchange Bank, Monthly Review, March, 1970, p. 137.
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PUBLIC LOANS BY NATIONS FROM 1959 TO 1970*
(In Thousands of United States Dollars)

Total of All
Countries

8
T3
Year

No. of
Loans

3
3"
CD

Amount

Countries
Japan

United States
No. of
Loans

Amount

1959

4

12,346

4

12,346

I960

1

5 ,0 0 0

1

5 ,0 0 0

1961

1

3 ,1 3 0

1

3 ,1 0 0

1962

5

5 3 ,0 8 1

3

2 9 ,5 1 8

1963

1

9 ,2 0 0

1

9,2 0 0

1964

6

3 5 ,4 7 9

4

1965

6

7 6 ,7 0 3

1966

20

1967

N o . of
Loans

Amount

West Germany
No. of
Loans

Amount

Other
No. of
Loans

Amount
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1

9 ,5 6 3

1

14,000

2 9 ,8 7 5

1

4 ,4 0 5

1

1,199

5

7 1 ,5 1 2

1

5 ,1 9 1

154,041

11

9 5 ,5 2 0

6

44,861

3

1 3 ,6 6 0

15

8 8 ,3 3 6

4

3 6 ,1 3 1

8

3 5 ,3 6 2

1

4 ,9 1 8

2

1 1 ,9 2 5

1968

14

8 2 ,6 2 8

7

48,715

4

1 8 ,6 1 3

3

1 5 ,3 0 0

1969

20

2 3 6 ,1 1 2

8

1 1 7 ,9 0 0

5

11,245

7

106,967

93

7 5 6 ,0 5 6

49

458 ,84 7

23

110 ,0 8 1

14

149,391
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1970*♦
Total

Source:

7

37,737

Korea Exchange Bank, Monthly Review, March, 1970, p. 137.

♦Public loans sire based upon agreements between the Korean government and foreign govern
ments or international financial institutions.
♦•Not available.
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PRIVATE LOANS BY NATIONS FROM 1962 TO 1970*
(In Thousands of United States Dollars)
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Total of All
Countries
Tear
No. of
Loans
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United, States
N o . of
Loans

Amount

Japan
No. of
Loans

Amount

No. of
Loans

2

1 ,8 5 1

1963

15

5 5 ,2 8 1

7

33,796

1964

10

6 3 ,2 6 8

2

6 ,2 9 8

1

380

1965

13

7 8 ,1 2 7

4

3 ,2 8 1

7

7 0 ,7 7 8

1966

32

1 0 5 ,1 5 8

7

5 ,3 9 1

14

6 7 ,1 2 5

9

1967

47

146,372

14

16,846

10

3 6 ,2 4 9

1968

91

4 6 5 ,8 3 9

36

135,640

23

1969

130

6 2 3 ,7 0 0

55

218 ,35 8

1970

4

2 0 ,5 0 0

3

344

1 ,5 6 0 ,0 9 6

128

Total

Other

West Germany

1962
CD
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Amount

Countries

Amount

N o . of
Loans

Amount

1

1 ,3 6 6

1

485

5

16 ,6 0 7

3

4 ,8 7 8

5

1 6 ,3 6 6

2

40,224

2

4 ,0 6 8

2 2 ,6 9 0

2

1 1 ,9 5 2

8

3 4 ,5 6 9

15

58 ,7 0 8

1 0 9 ,9 8 4

6

4 8 ,6 5 4

26

1 7 1 ,5 6 1

17

71,884

14

48,096

44

2 8 5 ,3 6 2

1 6 ,5 0 0

1

4 ,0 0 0

434 ,11 0

73

36 0 ,4 0 0

48

188,348

95

5 77 ,23 8
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•Private loans are based on the issue of letters of guarantee and export licenses which are
issued.
Source:

Korea Exchange Bank, Monthly Review, March, 1970, p. 137»
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DIRECT INVESTMENT BY NATIONS FROM 1962 TO 1970*
(In Thousands of United States Dollars)
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Countries
Year
N o . of
Loans
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Amount

Countries
Japan

United States
N o . of
Loans

Amount

N o . of
Loans

West Germany

Amount

1962

2

2,120

2

2,120

1963

5

5,442

2

5 ,1 3 8

1964

5

757

3

314

O
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1965

11

2 2 ,2 8 1

8

2 1 ,0 3 7

1966

12

2,462

10

2 ,3 0 9

1967

25

2 9 ,3 6 2

14

20,012

9

8,686

1968

50

2 9 ,3 1 0

18

12,001

27

1—H

1969

50

4 6 ,8 6 7

18

1 3 ,8 0 9

§

1970

4

881

1

162

139,482

76

Total

Amount

1
2

219

1,200

No. of
Loans

Amount

1

304

1

224

1

44

1

51

1

102

1

556

1

108

1 1 ,7 1 2

5

5,597

28

2 7 ,0 7 4

4

5,984

250

2

331

1

300

7 6 ,9 9 0

68

4 9 ,0 0 3

15

1 2 ,6 6 3

1—H
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No. of
Loans

Other

3

826
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♦Direct investments sire based upon Korean governmental authorization.
Source:

Korea Exchange Bank, Monthly Review, March, 1970, p. 137.
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TOTAL LOANS AND INVESTMENTS BY NATIONS, 1959-1970
(In Thousands of United States Dollars)

CD
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Year
N o . of
Loans

Amount

Countries
Japan

United. States
No. of
Loans

Amount

No. of
Loans

Other

West Germany

Amount

No. of
Loans

Amount

N o . of
Loans

Amount

1959

4

12,346

4

12,346

3
3.
"

i960

1

5 ,0 0 0

1

5 ,0 0 0

CD

1961

1

5 ,1 3 0

1

3 ,1 3 0

1962

9

5 7 ,0 5 2

5

31 ,6 3 8

2

1 0 ,9 2 9

2

14,485

1963

19

6 9 ,9 2 3

10

48,134

5

1 6 ,6 0 7

4

5 ,1 8 2

1964

21

99,504

9

36 ,4 8 7

1

380

7

2 0 ,9 9 0

4

41,647

1965

30

1 7 7 ,1 1 1

17

9 5 ,8 3 0

9

7 1 ,9 7 8

1

5 ,1 9 1

3

4,112

1966

64

2 6 1 ,6 6 1

28

101,220

20

1 1 1 ,9 8 6

13

3 6 ,4 0 1

3

1 2 ,0 5 4

1967

87

2 6 4 ,0 7 0

52

7 2 ,9 8 9

27

8 0 ,2 9 7

10

40,043

18

7 0 ,7 4 1

1968

155

577,777

61

196 ,35 6

54

140,309

6

4 8 ,6 5 4

34

1 9 2 ,4 5 8

1969

200

9 0 6 ,6 7 9

81

350,067

50

1 1 0 ,2 0 5

14

4 8,096

55

5 98 ,31 3

1970

8

2 1 ,3 8 1

4

1 6 ,7 5 0

3

4 ,3 3 1

1

300

599

2 ,4 5 5 ,6 3 4

253

969,947

164

519,484

124

739 ,29 2
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58

226 ,9 1 1

Summary of data from tables 1 through 3 .
%

39
the total foreign capital in Korea.

In addition, most public loans,

6 0 .7 percent, are from the United States.
commercial loans until 1968.

Japan ranked first in

In January, 197O, United States’ loans

to Korea surpassed those of the Japanese.

The United States has

dominated direct investment with 55 percent of the total; however,
Japan's direct investments have increased rapidly since I9 6 7 .
In the earlier period, public loans were the major source of
foreign capital, but commercial loans exceed public loans now.
Total investments through public loans and commercial loans were
$7 2 .7 million and $3«9 million, respectively, until 1 96 2.^

By

January, 1970, the latter increased to a total of $1.6 billion
for the period 1962-1970 while the former had a total of $7 5 6 .1
million from 1959-1970.

Some of the causes for the rapid increase

of private loans are the rapid economic growth policy of the govern
ment which intends to finance and supplement scarce capital in the
local economy without aggrevating inflation, more attractive terms
in foreign countries (e.g., lower interest rates and longer payment
periods), small local markets enable foreign capital to enjoy a
monopoly (firms may be able to charge monopolistic prices on goods
and services produced by foreign-financed enterprises), and the en
hanced business environment gives foreign investors confidence in
investments in Korea.
The amount of foreign investment varies significantly from in
dustry to industry.

Table 5» page 40, illustrates where investments

were made during 1 9 6 8 .

^Economic Planning Board, Economic Survey, I 9 6 9 , p . 159,
Table 6-2.
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TABLE 5
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LOAN PROJECTS BY INDUSTRY, DECEMBER 31, 1968
(In Millions of United States Dollars)
Type of Loan
Project Sectors

Public
Loan

Private
Loan

Direct
Investment

Primary Industry
0.4

Agriculture
Fishery

53.9

Primary Industry Sub-Total

0.4

53.9

10.6
48.6
5.6

1 1 6 .8
49.9

Secondary Industry (Manufacturing)
Foodstuff
Textile
Chemical fertilizer
Chemical products
Petroleum
Electronic appliance
Cement
Machinery
Steel and metal
Transportation equipment
Other
Secondary Industry Sub-Total

0.1
3.1
22.4

59.0
9.1
1.1

75.0

7.7
6.5

66.8
25.7
12.9
46.1

9.4

377.1

49.2

Third Industry (Social Overhead and
Construction)
Construction
Electric power
Water supply
Transportation
Transportation and sightseeing
Communication, transportation, and
electric power
Communication
Other
Third Industry Sub-Total
Total

9.8
47.7
4.7
90.7
2.7
111.1
25.4
64.9

30.7

1.4

243.2

141.8

4.1

3 1 8 .6

572.8

53.3

Source: Economic Planning Board, Economic Survey, 1969, P«
l4l, Table 6-4; p. 145, Table 6-7; and p. l4?, Table 6-9.
Public loans are invested in social overhead capiteuL which has
a long recovery period.

Examples of social capital uses include
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electric power, transportation, communication, and water supply.
Since public loans have relatively easy terms on interest and re
demption, they are well suited to long-term investment in which
private companies tend to be unwilling to invest.

Instead, commer

cial loans amd foreigners' investments may be put into profitable
industries such as textile, synthetic fibre, chemical fertilizer,
cement, petroleum chemistry, chemical products, and electrical
machinery and equipment.
Until 1 9 6 6 , most commercial loans had been guaranteed by the
government.

Commercial bank guaranteed loans increased rapidly

from SIOI.3 million in 196? to $405.6 million in 1968.^

The in

vestment environment and confidence has appsirently improved enough
to import capital equipment without government gusirantees.

The

government is attempting to diversify the debt guarantee of the
Industrial Bank of Korea.
Loan policies in foreign countries eire becoming more stringent
as the amount of foreign capital increases.

Loans of a low in

terest (5 *5 percent to 6 .0 percent) have decreased while highinterest loans (6 .5 percent to 8.0 percent) have increased.

See

Table 6, page 42.
One of the trends in attracting foreign capital is that the
unit of commercial loan is getting larger and more centralized.
Eleven loans by large companies in 1968 and 1969 accounted for $287
million, which is 29 percent of total commercial loans in the period.

^Economic Planning Board, A System for Foreign Capital Induce
ment and Its Actual Condition, (Economic Planning Board Press, I9 6 9 ).
^The Dong-A Daily, July 19, 1969» 2.
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TABLE 6
TREND IN KOREAN INTEREST RATES ON COMMERCIAL LOANS, 1966-I968
Years
1966

Interest Rates

1968

1967

No. of
Ho. of
Percent No. of pgrcgat
Percent
Loans
Loans
Loans
4 .5 0 to 3 .4 9 percent

1

3 .0

2

4 .7

3

3.6

3 .3 0 to 6 .4 9 percent

26

8 1 .8

29

6 7 .4

58

6 9 .1

6 .3 0 to 7 .9 9 percent

5

1 3 .2

11

2 3 .6

17

20.2

1

2.3

6

7 .1

43

100.0

84

100.0

8.00 percent and over
32

Total

100.0

Source; Economic Planning Board, Economic Survey. 1969, p.
144, Table 6-6.

The Present State of Technology Inducement Contracts
After the Korean government started to attract technology in
1962 when the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan began,
attraction of professional technicians increased rapidly.

Following

a diplomatic normalization between Korea and Japan, Japanese tech
nological personnel airrived in Korea.

By the end of 1969, 104

contracts involving various numbers of technical personnel had been
entered into.

See Table 7, page 43, for the number amd sources of

technology advisory contracts.
Table 8 on the following page illustrates the industries in
which the technology advisory contracts were made during the
period of 1962-1968.

Electronic appliances amd the machinery in

dustries had the largest number of technology advisory contracts
closely followed by chemistry products.
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TABLE 7
NUMBER OF TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY CONTRACTS BY NATION, 1962-1968

Total
of All
Countries

Year

Countries
United
States

_

West
Germany

Other

1962

1

4

1963

2

2

1964

1

1

1963

4

3

1966

15

3

1967

33

7

23

1968

42

6

31

2

3

104

28

64

4

8

Total
Source:
No. 5» p. 6.

3

1
8

2
1

Korea Exchange Bank, Consultant, May, 1969, Vol. 5,

TABLE 8
TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY CONTRACTS BY INDUSTRY THROUGH DECEMBER 31, I 968

Industries
Electronic appliances
Machinery
Chemistry products
Communication
Textile
Steel and iron
Synthetic fiber
Electric power
Source:
No. 3, p. 6.

Coâtrictf
26
20
17
10
6
3
4
3

Number of
Contracts

InduBtrie.

Foodstuff
Ceramics
Construction
Pulp and paper
Oil refinery
Livestock
Others
Total of all industries

3
2
2
2
1
1
2
104

Korea Exchange Bank, Consultant. May, 1969, Vol. 3,

Direct Investment
The first direct investment in Korea was made in June, 1962,
by Eisenberg, Incorporated, of the United States.

It entered into
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a partnership with Asia Automobile Company, Limited.
vestments have increased every year.
investments were completed.

Direct in

By March, 1969, 107 direct

The government’s interest in direct

foreign investment arose out of severe public criticism of commer
cial loans because commercial loans carried high interest rates and
did not provide any guarantee for capital investment.

Furthermore,

prior commercial loan agreements were falling due and required
scarce foreign exchange for payment.

Because of the advantages of

foreign capitaQ. to local finance, some businessmen committed the
mistake of believing that acquiring foreign capital was an easy
method to become wealthy.

They imported even ’’unfavorable” capital

without considering their repayment abilities.

Many foreign fi

nanced enterprises turned out to be unable to repay principal and
interest and went under the control of banks.

The cumulative in

crease in installment payments of principal amd interest on foreign
capital caused the international balance of payments to deteriorate.
Expecting that repayment was increasing, the government began to
make more restrictions on foreign capital.

The government turned

its attention from commercial loans to direct investment.

Direct

investment has more advantages than commercial loams, such as;
1.

It does not force repayment when there is no profit and

the foreign investor is responsible for its mamagement.
2.

It helps to not only tide over difficulties of interna

tional payments, but it also enables fulfillment of economic
development plans without creating inflation.

Direct investments

eliminate the risk of inflation.
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3.

Foreign direct investment makes it possible to save ex

penditures for losins, lowers local interest rates, and increases
the income of local employees, which in turn creates new effective
demand and stimulates domestic investment.

As investment increases,

businessmen can take advantage of mass production and produce goods
and services at lower costs.
4.

Direct investors try to participate in management by

sending their own staff members.

Their management expertise con

tributes to improved entrepreneurship in the host country.
5.

New techniques imported with direct investment help to

improve local techniques.
6.

Through direct investment, businessmen can get informa

tion about new products, new fashions and designs popular in
foreign markets, and other information important to the export
industry.
The classification in Table 9, page 46, shows that most direct
investments were made for the manufacturing industries.

Seventy-

nine percent of the total direct investment was concentrated in the
manufacturing industries, 19 percent was in social overhead capital
and the construction industries, and only two percent was in the
agriculture and fishery industries.

This investment relationship

supports the opinion that direct investments are profit-oriented.
Further analysis of investments by category of business shows that
they have invested mainly in highly profitable industries and labor
intensive industries.

According to Table 9, the following dollar

amounts and percentage relationships existed in direct investments:
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TABLE 9
DIRECT INVESTMENT BY INDUSTRY THROUGH DECEMBER 31, I968
Companies

Investments

Type of Industries
Number Percent

Dollars

Percent

Primary Industry
10
2

8 .9
1 .8

1 ,4 2 6 ,91 9
600 ,12 2

1 .6
0 .7

12

1 0 .7

2,027,041

2.3

2
2
12
3
5
4
3
14
7
17

1.8
1.8
10.6
2 .7
4.4
3 .5
2.7
12.3
6.2
14.9

2 ,287 ,58 7
202,888
3 ,920,758
7 ,650,516
2 2 ,6 00 ,00 0
3 ,7 6 8 ,4 5 3
7 ,6 7 6 ,9 0 0
4 ,2 3 0 ,0 2 9
1 ,746,067
1 2 ,1 18 ,40 3

2 .5
0.2
4 .3
8.4
24.5
4.1
8.4
4.6
1.9
1 3 .2

6
14

5 .3
12.4

2 ,625,401
2 ,5 80 ,76 5

2 .9
2.8

89

7 8 .6

7 1 ,4 12 ,74 5

7 7 .8

Electric power
Transportation and storage
Construction
Other

1
3
6
2

0.9
2.7
5 .3
1.8

5,000,000
1 ,3 70 ,34 0
1 0 ,974 ,30 0
7 76 ,47 5

5 .5
1 .5
12.0
0 .9

Third Industry Sub-Total

12

1 0 .7

1 8 ,1 21 ,11 5

1 9 .9

113

1 0 0 .0

9 1 ,5 61 ,50 1

100.0

Agriculture
Fishery
Primary Industry Sub-Total
Secondary Industry (Manufacturing)
Pulp Sind paper
Foodstuff
Textile
Synthetic fibre
Chemical fertilizer
Ceramics, cement, sind glass
Oil refinery
Chemical products
Steel and metal
Electronic appliance
Machinery smd transportation
equipment
Other
Secondary Industry Sub-Total
Third Industry (Social Overhead
and Construction)

Total

Source: Korea Chamber of Commerce smd Industries, Report on
Research on the Actual Condition of Foreign Invested Enterp rises.
P* 1 5 ,
Table ?.

fertilizer, $22.6 million (24.5 percent); electronic appliances,
$12.1 million (1 3 .2 percent); textiles, including synthetic fibre,
$11.6 million (12.7 percent); and oil refineries, $7.7 million
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(8.4 percent).

In some industrialized nations, their electronic

appliances industries face difficulties arising from labor shortages
and high wages; the Korean economy is in a favorable situation with
relatively cheaper labor.

It is expected that more direct invest

ments will be made in this industry.

Ratios of Foreign Investments to Korean Investments
The amount of total investments owned equally by local and
foreign investors represents approximately one-half of all invest
ments.

The ratio of investment has a relationship to types of

industries.

Key industries, such as fertilizer, oil refining, and

electric power have relatively even ratios of ownership because of
governmental policy that tries to avoid giving sole ownership of
key industries to foreign investors.

On the other hand, 100 per

cent foreign ownership is found in the electronic appliance in
dustry, which is highly profitable and requires a high degree of
skill.

The majority of joint investments are those enterprises in

which foreign investors own less than half of all stocks or shares.
This situation indicates that the foreigners' investment motives
center around profits rather than management participation.

See

Table 10, page 48, for the proportionate distribution of owner
ship in firms having foreign investments.

Foreign Investors' Investment Objectives
Direct investment in a foreign country is a type of capital
flow between nations for purposes of earning profits.

Entering

the 1 9 6 0 's, economies of advanced countries have progressed to the
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TABLE 10
RATIO OF OWNERSHIP BY FOREIGN INVESTORS THROUGH MARCH 31, 1969
(In Thousands of United States Dollars)

Percent of Foreign
Ownership

Total Foreign
Investments
Number

Amount Invested By
Foreign Investors

Percent

Dollars

Percent

Less than $0 percent

44

37.6

20,605

21.1

50 percent

24

20.5

48,941

5 0 .1

Over 50 percent but less
than 100 percent

26

22.2

1 2 ,1 8 7

1 2 .5

100 percent

23

19.7

1 5 ,9 0 2

1 6 .3

117

100.0

97,635

100.0

Total

Source: Korea Exchange Bank, Weekly Review, May 26, 1969,
Vol. 3, No. 21, p. 12.

point that the coefficient of capital (output/capital) is de
creasing.

On the other hand, since capital accumulation is low in

developing countries but there are still good opportunities for
investment, the capital coefficient in such countries is still
very high.

It is natural that capital flows from the advanced

countries to the developing countries.

However, the pattern of

investment and types of businesses to be invested in depend on the
degree of investment security, economic environment, level of
economic development, and profitability.

Generally, objectives

for investing in foreign countries are as follows:
1.

Investors search for a field of business expected to yield

a high rate of return on their investments.

In a developing

country, it is often found that present productivity is very low
because of lack of capital or a technical bottleneck.

Productivity
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may be increased significantly with comparatively little capital
and technical assistance.

Especially, when the target investment

country offers favorable treatment to foreign investors, the invest
ment motivation should become stronger.
2.

An abundant supply of relatively inexpensive skilled or

trainable labor in the invested country can be a strong motivation.
This motive is closely related to obtaining a high rate of return.
However, foreign investors frequently want to utilize labor in
labor-intensive industries which are declining in their own coun
tries because of increasing wages.
3»

Another objective is to develop raw materials.

Develop

ment of synthetic raw materials has replaced many natural raw
materials and weakened this motive.

However, foreign investments

are still made for the purpose of obtaining raw material.
4.
sell.

Another objective is to find a foreign market in which to
Investment is made not only to secure foreign markets, but

also to maintain such markets when local governments try to protect
local industries through international trade policies or foreign
exchange policies.

Investment is also desired to advance to another

country using the invested country as a base of operation.
In addition to these objectives, investments are made in a
foreign country to protect trademarks and patents, take advantage
of favorable tax treatments, or take advantage of mass production
through the development of foreign markets.
In summary, the Korean economy is poorly endowed with natural
resources; therefore, not much investment has been made for the
purpose of developing raw materials nor is such investment expected
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for the future.

Some investments have been made in oil refineries,

and petroleum chemistry is being developed for local markets.

How

ever, local markets are small and cannot be considered very important
until personal incomes increase.

The Korean government tries to

acquire foreign investment in the strategic industries such as
those which are labor-intensive, those having a high multiplier
effect, or key industries providing industrial development.
tronic appliances, machinery, textiles, and precision machine
industries will continued to hold top investment priorities.
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CHAPTER IV

PROBLEMS CREATED BY FOREIGN INVESTMENT

Two sets of problems arise out of foreign investment in Korea.
The first group includes problems affecting the Korean economy and
society.

Problems encountered by foreign investors comprise the

second group.

The nature and implications of these problems are

treated in the remainder of this chapter.

Major National Economic and Social Problems
The Korean economy has attained remarkable growth with the
assistance of foreign capital.
percent over the previous year.
cent.

During 1969, GNP increased by 15*5
The investment rate was 29 per

Approximately 40 percent of the GNP increase is attributable

to foreign investment.^

The growth rate may be too large.

Mem

bers of the International Economic Consultative Organization for
Korea pointed out at its third general meeting that the growth rate
was excessive and depended too much on foreign capital.

They

listed the following problems in their report to the International
Monetary Fund and questioned certain policies for attracting
foreign capital:
1.

There is too much dependency on foreign savings.

2.

Some of the foreign capiteQ. is merely for a "demonstra

tion" effect.

It encourages consumption and reduces savings.

^The Seoul Kyunje, December 5» 1969, p. 1.
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3.

Short-term and intermediate-term cash loans are increasing.

Some of these loans sire used for purposes other than production or
business management and are wasteful of foreign capital.
4.

There is an inconsistency in giving priority to attracting

foreign capital.

The government has set up rules of priority

according to the importance of various types of economic develop
ment.

However, the rules are often broken because of external

factors rather than economic ones.
5.

Lower priority capitaûL has been introduced and the repay

ment ability is uncertain.

This situation occurs because of severe

competition among local borrowers.

2

Because of the inconsistencies in the foreign investment
policies, the economy was both aided and injured by such capital.
Economic development has led to increased foreign capital invest
ment and increased imports.

The marginal propensity to import

(increase in imports/decrease in GNP) rose from 67 percent in 1966
to 87 percent in 1967; it was 83 percent in 1 9 6 8 .^
The International Monetary Fund in its report on the "High
Rate of Economic Growth in Korea," pointed out the vicious infla
tion caused by rapidly increasing wages, rising prices, and rapid
increase in liquidity exchanged with the cash loans.

4

The Federation of Korean Industries contended that the effec
tive use of foreign capital is impeded by a shortage of domestic

^The Dong-A Daily, April 22, 1 9 6 9 , p. 1,
^Ibid., September 11, 1 9 6 9 , p. 2.
^Ibid., November I8 , 1 9 6 9 , p. 1.
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capital, imperfect market research, small scales of production, and
a lack of management skills.^

Dependence on foreign capital.

Since the number of foreign

investors and the amount of investment have been so small, there
has been a deficit of trade in Korea.

Most of the deficits have

been covered with grants from the United States.

However, the

Korean government has had to seek a method for paying off the
deficits when the United States changed its foreign aid policy
and when revenues from sales to the military forces of the United
States were reduced by a "buy American" policy.

The need for

foreign exchange became greater when the government implemented the
First Five-Year Economic Development Plan in I96I.

Realizing that

attracting foreign capiteil was the only way to raise funds, the
government started to take a more positive attitude toward foreign
capital.

As a result, $2.5 billion of foreign capital had been in

vested as of January, 1970.^

Some of the foreign investments have

reached the end of the unredeemable period during 1970, and repay
ment of the principal and interest started in 1971.

The amount of

redemption will be increasing each year for the next several yesirs.
The repayment problem will become more serious as time passes.
According to the repayment schedule, the following amounts of
capital are to be repayed;

$167 million in 1970, $198 million in

^Federation of Korean Industries, Economic Movement in 1968
and the Prospect of the New Year, Research Bulletin 52, (Seoul:
December, 1 9 6 9 P* l4o.
^Korea Exchange Bank, Monthly Review, March, 1970, p. 137•
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1971, $239 million in 1 9 7 2 , $254 million in 1973, $258 million in
1 9 7 4 , and $293 million in 1 9 7 5 The msiin causes of the trend of
increasing repayment burdens are the increasing dependency on com
mercial loans, financing working capital from foreign countries,
repayment fees, and the importation of raw materials for foreignfinanced projects.
A result of research conducted on 45 foreign-financed enter
prises shows that the average rate of dependency on imported
material is over 80 percent.

The dependence upon imported raw

materials is highest in oil refining with 100 percent, iron and
steel with 9 9 .7 percent, fertilizer with 9 7 -3 percent, and textiles
with 88.4 percent.

Most of Korea's key industries had more than 88

percent of raw materials imported.

Only the electronics and

machinery industries show a relatively low dependency of only 23
g

percent.

The Japanese Economic Times commented, "Since the growth

tempo of the Korean economy is faster than that of domestic produc
tive capacity, she will see a shortage of materials in every field
of industry, which should be supplemented with imports and the
result will be to increase foreign debts."

9

The balance of payments deficits will increase as United
States' expenditures decrease for goods supplied to the military
forces in Viet Nam, including a decrease in the United States'
dollars spent for Korean military forces and technicians in Viet

^The Dong-A Daily, December 9, 1969, p. 2.
g

Korea Efficiency Association, Modern Management, September,
1 9 6 8 , p. 7 6 .
^The Japanese Economic Times. April 7, 1969, p. 1.
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Nam.

Since military forces and technicians were dispatched to Viet

Nam in June, 1 9 6 5 , total receipts reached $530 million (or 19.8
percent of the total export receipts during the same period), and
they contributed 3*2 percent to the economic growth rate.^^

It is

expected that the receipts will decrease as the Viet Nam war ends.
This situation will reduce the level of foreign exchange holdings
of Korea.

Importing unfavorable foreign capital.

Local businessmen have

used foreign investments, at times, in inappropriate ways.

Some

times they are caught in the illusion that the way to become rich
is to obtain foreign capital.

Some accept extremely unfavorable

terms to obtain foreign capital.

There are some advantages to

direct investment for a joint venture.
1.

For example;

Local businessmen try to invite foreign investors to solve

financial difficulties.

They use foreign investments for facil

ities, services, and raw materials.
2.

With the foreign investors’ guarantee of credits, they have

access to international credit from a capital exporting country or
sin international finance organization.
3.

They receive advanced management and engineering tech

niques developed in the investors' countries.
4.

They obtain a monopoly on the local market by utilizing

the patents of the investing company.
5.

The trademark of the investing company cam be used for a

"demonstration" effect in marketing.

^^The Dong-A Daily, October 24, 19&9; p. 2.
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6.

In the case of the exporting company, it may provide entry

into foreign markets.
The primary attraction of direct investment and commercial
loans is the difference of interest rates in the local financial
market from those in foreign financial markets.

Local industrial

finance bonds aire being sold at the interest rate of 31.2 percent
per a n n u m . D i s c o u n t
per annum.

12

time deposits for l8 months pay 29.2 percent

The interest rates on foreign capital, on the other

hand, range from 4.5 percent to 8 percent per annum.

Moreover,

it is difficult to get long-term financing, especially in large
amounts, even at a high interest rate.

Occasionally, borrowers pay

a special commission to finance brokers to get large loans.

It is

easier to understand why local businessmen are desperate to get
foreign capital.

The competition is so severe that the terms of

foreign capital are becoming unfavorable.

14

Yung R. Kim, editorial writer of the Joong-ang Daily, blames
the increasing unfavorable investment terms to government policy.
Using a loan from Japan as an example, the following events are
likely to occur;

When the Korean government approves an application

for foreign capital of more than the amount that the Japanese

^^The Korean Reconstruction Bank, Industry Financing Bond,
August, 1 9 6 9 .
^^Korea Exchange Bank, Consultant, Vol. 3» No. 5, March, I 9 6 9 ,
p. 1.
^^Economic Planning Board, A System for Foreign Capital Inducement and Its Actual Condition, (Economic Planning Board Press, May,
1 9 6 9 ), p. 6 9 .
^^Korea Efficiency Association, Modern Memagement, June, 196?,
p. 68.
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government ie willing to offer, the local businessmen who received
permission to import foreign capital from Japan start to compete
with each other and bid up the price of the capital.

These compet

itors have spent considerable time and effort getting such
permission.

If one is unsuccessful in the bid, he may suffer a

leirge loss or even go bankrupt.

Therefore, he has to "beg" at the
1C

doors of the Japanese government authorities.

It is not diffi

cult to imagine how unfavorable contracts can arise under this type
of circumstances.

Korean businessmen must accept undesirable loan

terms such as short-term periods, nonredeemable periods, and a high
retaining fee.

As a result, they have to start repaying principal

and interest before the foreign financed plan commences operating.

Cash loans.

Local businessmen may attempt to set up enter

prises with no capital of their own.

They try to establish their

facilities through capital goods attraction contracts and operate
them with cash loans.
feiilure.

Herein lies the factors of their imminent

Recognizing that cash loams for working capital, raw

materials, facilities, and even for retaining fees disturb the money
and banking system, the government has restricted cash loans.

How

ever, total cash loans amounted to $l6 0 .5 million for 39 loans by
November, 1969.^^

^^Ibid., pp. 68-69.
^^Foreign Exchamge Bank, The Present Situation and Problems of
Foreign Capital Inducement, 1969, p. 4$.
^^The Dong-A Dally, December 8, 1969, p. 2.
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The following are considered to be the main reasons for the
increase in cash loans:

the capacity of domestic finance has

reached its limits and can no longer satisfy the increasing demand
for funds; cash loans are more favorable than domestic loans in
terms of interest; repayment of foreign capital reduces foreign ex
change holdings; and there is no way, in a short period of time, to
fill the increasing deficit in the international balance of payments.
The undesirable fact is that cash loans are used for main
taining the present foreign exchange holdings and for repaying
principal and interest on existing foreign loans.

TA

Another ser

ious problem arises because most borrowers do not have their own
capital to back up the loans, thus causing some foreign-financed
enterprises to go bankrupt.

19

Another problem created by foreign cash loans is their tendency
to increase inflation.

Korean nationals are not allowed to possess

foreign exchange currencies.
exchange account.

All exchange is pooled into a foreign

A foreign exchange holder can either leave funds

in the custody of or sell to an authorized bank or agency.

Such

activities increase the amount of currency and cause inflation.
The resulting inflation has a more hsirmful effect to the economy
than that caused by currency expansion, in the sense that the cash
loan is a debt to be repaid in the future.

Some of the cash loans

are made for raw materials for domestic uses.

The result is to

1A
The Joong-Ang Daily. August 12, 1969, p. 2.
^^The Dong-A Daily, August l6, I9 6 9 , P- 2.
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provide a special benefit to foreign-financed enterprises at the
expense of the national economy.

Questionable enterprises.

Since the First Five-Year Economic

Development Plan started, the policy to reduce excessive economic
growth has been enforced.

The policy has been successful due to

the beneficial management of foreign capital.

However, the quantity-

oriented policy for foreign capital has resulted in creating
problems.

The desire to gain windfall profits was responsible for

starting some foreign-financed enterprises.

21

Due to the scarcity

of buyers and sellers in the market, businessmen could make an ex
orbitant profit through obtaining monopoly prices.

Some

enterprises which aure not able to enjoy a monopoly had to discon
tinue, and the banks who guaranteed repayment had to repay the
debt for the bankrupted firms.

22

Some foreign-financed enterprises

have attempted to engage in monopolistic practices.

Industries

beneficial to the overall national economy were neglected in the
process.
tively.

Scarce foreign capital, thus, was distributed less effec
Prices rose and weakened Korea's ability to compete

internationally.

The number of such questionable enterprises was

83 out of 271 cases at the end of March, 1969.

It is believed that

many of the other loans were disguised enterprises maintained by

ZOlbid.. July 2 5 , 19 6 9 , p. 2.
^^Foreign Exchange Bank of Korea, Monthly Review, October,
1 9 6 7 , Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 1 6 .
^^The Dong-A-Daily. April 22, 1969, P* 2.
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domestic monopolies.

25

These enterprises axe not only frequently

unable to repay debt but also increase the burden of international
repayment and accelerate imports for consumption.

Rising prices in foreign-financed companies.

Monopoly pricing

practices of mamy businessmen in foreign-financed firms have re
sulted in a cost-push effect.
increases costs.

Dependency on imported raw materials

The high cost effect is not limited to foreign-

financed projects but extends to other firms' products which use
semi-manufactured articles of the foreign-financed company.

It has

resulted in higher prices than many international commodity prices.
The uncompetitive prices are illustrated in Table 11, page 6l.
One explanation of the relatively high prices is that plants and
facilities of Korean firms with foreign capital are often smaller
than optimum economic scale, thus increasing costs and prices.

Inconsistent applications of policies.

According to the

Foreign Capital Inducement Law, priority is to be given to those
projects which contribute to the improvement of the international
balance of payments, development of key industries or public enterprises, and projects included in the economic development plans.

Z^Ibid.
oil

Korea Efficiency Association, Modern Management, September,
1968, p . 75.

25
Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industries, Economic Prospect
and Problems in the New Year, (Seoul; January, I 9 6 8 ) , p. 220 .
^^Economic Planning Board, Foreign Capital Inducement Law,
(Economic Planning Board Press: I9 6 6 ;, p. 4.
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TABLE 11
COMPARISONS OF DOMESTIC PRODUCTION COSTS AND
RETAIL PRICES WITH INTERNATIONAL PRICES*
(In Korean Won)

Types of Products

Units

Cost of
Products

Domestic
Retail
Prices

Inter
national
Retail
Prices

Nylon yarn

Pound

.85

1 .4 7

.75

Exlan yarn

Pound

1.43

1 .2 8

.6 2

Cashimilon

Pound

1.32

1 .2 8

.6 2

Cement

Sack

.72

.82

.9 3

Plain tile

Foot

1.14

2 .0 0

3 .2 5

Phosphureted fertilizer Ton

27.03

4 7 .0 9

5 1 .5 0

Urea fertilizer

Ton

73.22

7 3 .2 2

84.00

Newsprint paper

Ton

1 9 4 .9 8

2 0 6 .0 5

1 5 0 .0 0

Silicon iron

Ton

2 6 0 .0 0

1 7 3 .0 0

1 7 0 .0 0

Electric wire

Ton

3 ,0 9 5 .5 0

3 ,4 4 9 .2 0

2 ,9 2 0 .0 0

Binoculars

Item

Gasoline

Barrel

PVC

Ton

Caustic soda

Ton

1 8 .6 6

6 .5 0
4.41

5 .3 6

4 5 9 .3 6

5 1 1 .6 3

240.00

5 5 .1 7

5 5 .1 7

8 0 .0 0

•Costs, sale prices, eind international prices are calculated by
dividing Won, the basic unit of Korean money, by 279*50, the basic
exchange rate of the Bank of Korea on September 30, 1968
Source; Korea Efficiency Association, Modern Management,
September, 1968, p. 75, Table 3*

The priority policy, however, is not always followed.

For example,

the government allowed foreign capital to be invested in the soft
drinks industry. 27
27

Foreign Exchange Bank, The Present Situation and Problems of
Foreign Capiteil Inducement, 1969, P* 46.
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Demonstration effect.

Foreign capital all too frequently is

attracted to create a '•demonstration" effect.
in technological development contracts.

This is often found

The technology itself may

not be worth importing, but local businessmen try to use the name
of a world famous company for marketing purposes.

The technology

does not improve the quality of goods and services but merely promotes consumption and misallocates foreign capital.

?8

Problems Encountered By Foreign Investors in Korea
So far, problems facing the Korean economy as a whole have
been reviewed.

In this section, specific problems confronting

foreign-financed firms are discussed.

In addition, those activ

ities which businessmen want the Korean government to engage in
are discussed.
follows.

Several studies have provided the data which

The Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industries conducted

a survey on foreign investment in May, 1 9 6 9 .

The Federation of

Korean Industries released "Inducement Factors and Obstructive
Factors Reflected in the Eyes of Foreign Investors in Korea," in
September, I9 6 8 .

The Korea Productivity Center published, "Foreign

Capital Inducement and Actual Condition of Foreign-Invested Enter
prises," in May, 1966.^^

Economic Planning Boeurd, Economic Survey, 1968, p. 1?.
29

The Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industries distributed
104 questionnaires to foreign-invested enterprises and collected
58 answers, or a 55*8 percent reply. The Federation of Korean In
dustries conducted its survey on 90 firms chosen from foreignfinanced enterprises, agencies, branches, banks, service agencies,
and applicants for business permits. Twenty-five firms were per
sonally interviewed and 65 were sent mail questionnaires. The
Productivity Center interviewed 54 enterprises, 28 of which re
plied.
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The Chamber of Commerce and Industries listed 13 problems con
sidered to cause the companies difficulties.
to select the five most severe problems.

It asked officials

According to Table 12,

below, 27 firms, or 15 percent, mentioned the "shortage of working

TABLE 12
PROBLEMS IN BUSINESS MANAGEMENT

Types of Problems

Number
of Firms

Percent
of Firms

Shortage of raw materials

16

8.9

Shortage of working capital

27

1 5 .0

Financial difficulty

19

10.6

High interest rate

12

6 .7

Shortage of facilities

15

8 .3

9

5 .0

15

8 .3

5

2.8

15

8 .3

High wages

9

5 .0

High taxes

11

6.1

Difficulties in developing markets

20

11.1

7

).9

180

1 0 0 .0

Shortage of electricity
Transportation difficulties
Inadequate harbor facilities
Technical problems

Other reasons
Total

Source: The Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industries, Re
port on Research on the A c t u ^ Condition of Foreign-invested
Enterprises, (Seoul: May, 1 9 6 9 ). P« 56, Table 35.

capital."

This is a problem common to sLLmost all firms in Korea.

The number of firms mentioning "financiguL difficulties" and "high
interest rates" were 19 and 12, respectively.
a close relationship to the first one.

These problems have

The second highest fre

quency was "difficulty in developing a market," with 20 firms and
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11.1 percent of the total.

Since national income still remains at

a relatively low level and purchasing power is concentrated in
several urban areas, the domestic market is very small.

However,

as national income increases and active advancement into foreign
markets aire made, this problem will gradually be solved.
The Korea Productivity Center obtained similar results from
its survey conducted in March, 1966.

"Shortage of working capital"

took first place with 29.7 percent of the firms mentioning it;
"difficulty in securing markets," 1 6 .2 percent; "high interest
rates," 15.6 percent; "shortage of raw materials," 10.8 percent;
and "shortage of facilities," 10.8 p e r c e n t . T h e

characteristics

of problems hampering foreign-financed companies have not changed
since 1966.

They tend not to be problems with easy solutions

quickly solved.

Especially, financial problems will not be eased

until a larger domestic capital base is developed.
So far, internal management problems have been investigated.
Next, the disadvantages arising out of government administration
will be examined.

The Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industries

surveyed firms asking;

"What are the serious encumbrances you en

counter when trying to invest in Korea?"

Respondents were asked

to rank the five major problems in declining order.

See Table 15,

page 6 5 , for the investment problems firms encountered.
Forty-three firms, or 22.5 percent, stated that administrative
procedures were too complicated; I8 .I percent of the firms ex
perienced inconveniences arising from differences in social and

^^Korea Productivity Center, Survey on Foreign Loan and Invest
ments , Productivity Research Series No. 59, (Seoul: Maurch, 19^6),
p. 6 9 , Table 53.
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TABLE 15
FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROBLEMS IN KOREA
Number
of Firms

Percent
of Firms

Complicated administrative procedures

45

2 2 .3

Inconveniences arising from differences
in socisil and economic systems and
customs

55

1 8 .1

Poor service of government agencies

29

1 5 .0

Shortage of social overhead capital

27

14.0

High tax rates

19

9 .8

Low productivity

11

5 .7

Shortage of natural resources and
specialists

10

5 .2

Labor disputes

4

2.1

Costs of fringe benefits

5

1.6

12

6.2

193

100.0

Investment Problems

No answer
Total

Source: The Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industries, Report
on Research on the Actual Condition of Foreign-invested Enterprises.
(Seoul: May, 19^9), Table 5 6 , p. 5 8 .
economic systems and customs; 1 5 .O percent complained about poor
service of government agencies; 14.0 percent said social overhead
capital was insufficient; 9 .8 percent complained about high tax
rates; 5.7 percent mentioned low worker productivity; and 5*2 per
cent stated a shortage of natural resources and specialists created
problems.
Similar answers were collected by the Federation of Korean In
dustries.

According to its report, ?6.9 percent of those surveyed

complained that applications and interpretations of the Foreign
Capital Inducement Law and related regulations were not clear smd
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that coordination between different governments was inadequate;
55«8 percent of the firms said that government policies and regula
tions were so unstable that it was hard to prepare for changes.
"Complaints about the high tax rates" was cited by 46.2 percent of
the total.

The other obstacles pointed out were "inadequate social

development," "economic instability," "housing shortages," incon
venient living conditions," "neglecting commercieuL contracts," and
"rapid increases in wages."

Ambiguity of law and regulations.

Both surveys revealed that

the most serious obstructions to foreign investors were ambiguous
laws and administrative red tape.

Since the laws and regulations

are not clearly defined, some regulations can be interpreted dif
ferently by the various agencies.

For example, Paragraph 1,

Article 4, of the Foreign Capital Inducement Law gives the standard
upon which authorizations or approvals of applications for importing
foreign capitsil are made, namely, the extent of expected contribu
tion of the capital to the improvement of the international balance
of payments or the development of key industries or public enter
prises.
judgment.

Here, the "extent" can become a matter of a subjective
Approval depends absolutely upon the opinion of the

government agency concerned.

Applicants have no way of proving

that their projects are suitable to meeting the standard.

One

agency might evailuate an application highly and another could
evaluate it in an opposite manner.

Even the same agency may eval

uate the same application differently.

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

67
Red tape in administrative procedures.

In order to give care

ful consideration to attracting foreign capital, the government set
up several checking stages to evaluate applications before final
approval.

First, foreign investors must go to the Minister of the

Economic Planning Board.

The Minister examines the applications

for compatibility of the project by using the following factors as
defined in Article 3 of the Enforcement Decree of the Foreign In
ducement Law;
1.

Amount of foreign capital required

2.

Cost of commodities to be imported

3.

Applicability of Article 44 of the Law (feasibility of

domestic supply of the commodities to be imported)
4.

Terms of the proposed contract

5.

Production capacity, production cost, smd production

schedule
6.

Production schedules considered in terms of domestic and

international marketability
7.

Production processes and other technical matters

8.

Raw material procurement plans

9.

Plant site conditions smd construction plans

10.

Amount of domestic capitsJ. required (classified by facil

ities sector, plant operation sector, and other funds)
11.

Feasibility of procuring domestic capital required (based

upon the amount determined in the preceding paragraph)
12.

Feasibility of repaying principal and interest in terms of

profitability
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13.

Confirmation as to whether domestically manufactured

capital goods substituted for foreign capital goods will be more
than 30 percent of the contract price
14.

Financial ability of the borrower based upon his ability

to maintain a capital account on the balance sheet to over 20 per
cent of foreign capiteil acquired until the termination of repayment
of principal and interest
15.

Borrower's plans for and his ability to furnish collatereil^^

On receiving the application, the Minister of the Economic
Planning Board presents the necessary documents to the appropriate
Minister and receives his opinion.

The Minister, when submitting

his opinion, examines the pertinent matters in connection with the
subscription of stocks or shares, cash loan contract, capital goods
inducement contract, or technological inducement contract provided
for in Article 3 of the Enforcement Decree and sends his opinion
to the Minister of the Economic Planning Board within 30 days from
the date of receipt of the documents.

Before drawing his opinion,

the Minister asks the opinion of appropriate banking institutions
about a cash loan contract.

He also gets the opinion of the Min

ister of Construction about the location of the plant for capital
goods inducement contracts.

It takes a relatively long time to

obtain a final decision from the Economic Planning Boaird.

Frequent changes in regulations and government policies.

The

Korean economy has functioned under the capitalistic system for a

^^Economic Planning Board, Foreign Capital Inducement Law,
(Seoul; 1 9 6 6 ), pp. 24-28.
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brief period of time.

The government established economic develop

ment planning in 1962.

However, it could not make a comprehensive

plan partly because of insufficient statistical data and partly
because of a lack of experience in long-range planning.
ment has depended upon trial-and-error methods.
the comprehensive plan from time to time.

The govern

It has modified

Excess achievements be

yond the original growth objectives during the First and the Second
Economic Development Plans are largely the result of an underesti
mation of the expected rate of economic growth during the period.
Since the level of foreign exchange holdings has been very low,
the government has not been able to adopt a steady policy but has
made changes according to the situation of foreign exchange
holdings.

Laws and regulations, including the Foreign Capital In

ducement Law prepared under this situation, also have had to be
chainged.

It is anticipated that it will take a long time to achieve

a sound economy, stable policy, and more perfect laws and regula
tions .

Differences in social and economic systems and customs.

The

social and economic systems and customs developed in various coun
tries are different from each other.
emotion than Western societies.

Korean customs involve more

It is interesting to observe that

Western business contracts are made in the office after evaluating
the benefits, whereas, Korean businessmen make preliminary contracts,
if they are important ones, at restaurants, tea rooms, or while en
joying themselves at Korean-style bars.

It is not unusual that a

compromise is effected on the basis of emotion rather than reason.

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

70
Services of administrative agencies»

Even though little may

be done about uncontrollable factors such as the lack of natural
resources, it is a very serious issue to see that so many firms in
dicate problems arising from "red tape" amd "poor services of
government officials" sind, as a result, corrective actions are
being taken to correct these situations.

High tax rates.

Since aid from the United States started in

1 9 4 5 , grants-in-aid have accounted for more than 10 percent of the
Korean GNP until I96O.

This aid had relieved material shortages

and had been an important source of government revenue.

The pro

portion of the counterpart funds, or revenues from sales of grant
aid materials, ranged from 40 percent to 50 percent in the 1 9 5 0 's.
But the proportion has decreased since i960 to 11.8 percent in
1 9 6 8 .^^

Moreover, the government has had to raise funds for eco

nomic development plans.

In order to finance economic development

through compulsory savings, the government revised I3 tax laws and
established two new taxes.

34

The proportion of tax collected to

GNP has risen sharply from 8 .6 percent in I965 to I6 .0 percent in
1 96 8.

The rate is expected to continue

Lack of social overhead capital.

to increase.

While Korea's economy, over

all, grows rapidly, social overhead capital has been unable to keep

^^Korea Exchainge Bank, Weekly Review, December 30, 1968, Vol. 2,
No. 5 2 , p. 8.
^^Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industries, Economy Prospect
and Problems in the New Year, January, I9 6 8 , p. 21?.
^^Ibid., p. 1 1 6 .
^^Economic Planning Board, Economic Survey, 1968, p. 4, Table 2.
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pace.

Since social overhead capital needs require a large amount

of investment and the rate of return on this type of investment is
low, private enterprises do not provide adequate sums of social
capital.

It is necessary to develop transportation facilities,

electricity, water for industry, and reduce the fees for these fa
cilities.

It is encouraging that a modern highway is being built

across the nation for truck transportation.

Also, construction of

hydroelectricity and thermal electricity plants is being undertaken.
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V

MEASURES TO SOLVE FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROBLEMS

A number of solutions to many of the major foreign investment
problems are presented in this chapter.

Emphasis is placed upon

the values accruing to the Korean people by solving their economic
development problems.

In various instances, it is demonstrated

that Korea benefits in the long-run by reducing the conflicts
encountered by foreign investors.

Supplementing Domestic Working Capital
As rapid economic growth continues, the shortages of working
capital increase each year.

Enterprises are making new investments

in facilities to increase their productive capacity in order to
catch up with their competitors' expansions.
pansions have been made through debt.

However, these ex

Capital has been acquired

from foreign investors for facilities and working capital has been
obtained from the domestic financial markets at high interest rates.
In an advanced capitalistic economy, where the corporate form
of business organizations and the securities markets are highly de
veloped, available resources for investment tend to be mobilized
more efficiently through the capital markets.

In contrast, Korean

banking institutions have been playing a key role in the mobiliza
tion of resources.

Eventually, the heavy dependence on direct

financing through banking institutions restricts investment
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decisions, especially in the private sector.

Moreover, the re

sources of banking institutions tend to be more limited.
The securities msurket is usually the financial market for
long-term capital needs.

Banking institutions are supposed to

provide business enterprises with short-term operation funds.

How

ever, Korean banks have to provide long-term capital as well as
short-term loems.

For the purpose of restoring the functions of

banking institutions and securing long-term capital through direct
fineincing channels, the Capital Market Fostering Law was proposed.
On November 8, 1968, the National Assembly passed the law aind re
vised the laws affecting corporation and personal income taxes.
Under the provisions of these laws, the government guarantees
at least minimum dividends to the owners of securities listed on
the stock market.

Dividends are taux deductible.

Certain corpora

tions are requested to make stock available to the general public.
This practice is needed because one of the impediments to stock
market development is that stocks are often owned by one family
and, therefore, are not available to the public.^
The Korea Investment Development Corporation was established
to direct plans for increasing public investment in stocks.

The

law also permits banking institutions to establish syndicates for
underwriting stocks.

It was hoped when passing the law that the

various functions of the stock market would be strengthened and a
financial cheuanel developed between the public and businesses.

2

^Korea Exchange Bank, Monthly Review, January, 19&9, Vol. 3»
No. 1, p . 3 6 .
^Ibid.
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Regulations for listing stocks were drastically relaxed to facili
tate listing and to let banks establish departments of securities
to help channel small amounts of funds into capitsil investments.^
With the Capital Market Fostering Law, the government pro
vided penalties against foreign-financed firms which did not list
their securities.

The purposes are to open such firms to public

ownership, to diversify listed stocks, and to give the public a
variety of choices when participating in the capital market.^

Reducing Red Tape
Recognizing that red tape is a great obstruction to attracting
foreign capital, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry reduced the
amount and complexity of procedures for the electronic appliance
industry.
1.

The following changes were made:
The procedures of receiving and sending documents were

simplified.
2.

The verification of materials, approval of exports and

imports, and recommendations for custom tax exemptions were de
cided at the supervisory level.
5»

According to Article 44 of the Foreign Capital Inducement

Law, certain commodity items cannot be imported.

The policy is

limited in its application only to the electronic appliance in
dustry.

It is expected to be extended to other major industries.^

^Economic Planning Board, Economic Survey, 1968, p. 357•
^Korea Exchange Bank, Monthly Review, January, 1969, Vol. 5,
No. 1, p . 4 3 «
^Ibid., pp. 55-56.
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The government has arranged bonding measures for foreign in
vestors.

If a foreign-invested firm is registered under the Foreign

Capital Inducement Law, and if the products are completely exported,
it caui arrange to bond its imported materials.^

The bonding

measure provides highly simplified procedures, thus saving time in
obtaining import and export licenses and custom clearances.

Improving the Service of Administrative Agencies
The government has attempted to improve its efficiency and
services through training programs.

According to Article 8 of the

Foreign Exchange Management Law, a loss may be compensated upon re
quest if suffered from willful neglect of duty by an agency or a
7
person in charge of foreign capital.
The Minister of the Economic
Planning Board can order compensation.
Part of the problems with administrative procedures and serv
ices that cause inconveniences to foreign investors arise from the
differences in social and administrative orders and customs.

In

order to solve these problems, the Ministry of the Economic
Planning Board set up the Office of Investment Promotion to provide
assistance and advice to foreign investors in solving various
problems related to the establishment and operation of foreigninvested enterprises in Korea.

^Economic Planning Board, Questions and Answers for Your In
vestment in Korea, p. 8.
7
'Economic Planning Board, Handbook of Economic Cooperation.
1 9 6 7 , p. 248.
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Enhancing Social Overhead Capital
The expansion of the Korean economy requires the simultaneous
expansion of social overhead capital and public services.

Short

ages of transportation and electricity and ein urgent demand for
more communication facilities have recently appeared.

In a de

veloping country, emphasis is usually placed on developing scarce
resources and achieving rapid growth through rapid industrialization.
Social overhead capital needs often are neglected because they re
quire large sums of capital and they require a long repayment
period.

Therefore, an imbalance is apt to result between manu

facturing industries and needs for social overhead capital.
Transportation difficulties arose in I 965 as economic develop
ment continued to advance.

Lack of adequate transportation has
g

become a chronic obstacle to economic development.

Because of a

railroad-oriented transportation policy of the government, invest
ment has been mainly in railroad transportation.

By the early

1968 period, railroads were transporting 75»9 percent of total
Q
freight in Korea.
To ease the burden on railroads and provide
more balance in economic development over the entire nation, the
Ministry of Construction planned to complete by 1976 eleven new
highways extending 1,125 miles.

A 250 mile highway connecting

Seoul and Inchon and another between Seoul and Pusan has already
been completed.

A 1B7 . 5 mile highway between Tae-Jun and Sun-Chun

and 146.5 mile highway between Seoul and Kang-Nung were started in

^Federation of Korean Industries, Economic Movement in 1968
emd Prospect of New Year, (December, 1968), p. 1 0 8 .
^Foreign Exchange Bank, The Present Situation and Problems of
Foreign Capital Inducement. January, 1969, p. 111.
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1970.

A ground-breaking ceremony is scheduled in 1972 for the re

maining highway to be constructed.^^
With the completion of these projects, the entire nation will
be within the range of a one-day's drive.

Transportation difficul

ties will be eased, and a great contribution will be made toward
indus trial developmen t .
The national economy faced an electricity shortage beginning
in late 1966.

Suddenly, it was necessary to provide limited trans

mission of electricity to homes, factories, and even to street
Isunps.

The shortage started as a result of a long drought which

slowed down the turbines generating hydroelectricity.

However,

due to the active participation of the government in developing
electricity, supply eind demand were in close balance after 1968.^^
The total capacity of power plants has increased from 771,64$ kilo
watts in 1966 to 91 7 ,2 4 5 in 1967*
watts in August, 1 9 6 8 .^^
sources of electric power.
1 9 7 4 .^^

Capacity reached 1,124,24$ kilo

A plan was set up for the development of
The goal is 6 ,1 6 9 ,000 kilowatts by

Another measure, in 1968, to find a solution to the power

problem was to have private companies develop electrical power.
The Korea Electric Power Company, partly owned by the government,
had been the only developer of electric power up to that time.

^°Hanil Bank, Weekly Hanil, March 10, I9 6 9 , No. $$0, p. 17.
^^Federation of Korean Industries, Economic Movement in 1968
and Prospect of New Year, December, 1 9 6 8 , p. 116.
l^Ibid., p. 1 1 7 , Table $.
^^Korea Exchange Bank, Monthly Review, March, 1969, Vol. 3,
No. 3, p. 3 6 .
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private compainies have begun building a large-scale facility in
Ik
Korea. ^

Developing Fetrming Villages
Since the advent of rapid economic growth, emphasis was placed
mainly on manufacturing and social overhead capital.

The primary

industries of agriculture, fishing, and forestry, which account
for an annual average of Jk percent of vauLue added, have been neg
lected.
percent.

These industries have an annual growth rate of only 4.0
The stagnant agriculture industry has not been able to

provide a self-sufficiency of food for Korea.

The nation has had

to import an annual average of 7 ,8 5 0 ,0 0 0 metric tons of foreign
grain during the period from 1958 to 1968.

Grain imports amount

to approximately 12.5 percent of the total demauid for grains.
The relatively low productivity of farming and fishery villages
has resulted in low incomes to farmers sind fishermen.
their products have been limited to urban areas.

Markets for

Furthermore, the

development of raw materials has been reduced as a result of
stagnant farming eind fishing methods.

A large aimount of foreign

exchange has been spent for importing raw materials.

In order to

attain a self-sufficiency of food, increase the purchasing power
of rural communities, expand markets for goods auid services pro
duced, and accelerate the development of raw materials for industry,
the government enacted the Farm Industrialization Promotion Law.
has 11 projects underway to increase incomes for farmers and

^^Economic Movement in 1968 and Prospect of New Year, p. 121.
^^Economic Survey, 1 96 8, p. 220, Table 5-7.
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fishermen.

Under the agricultural law of September 3* 1969» a

long-reuage project will be established to industrialize the rural
communities.

The government will assist in the following ways:

1.

Subsidize or pay the rent for factory sites

2.

Build roads

3.

Give priority for access to foreign capital

4.

Make special eurrangements for transmission of electricity

5*

Make loans at low interest rates

6.

Guarantee the presence of raw materials

7.

Find markets for investors

8.

Exempt taxes on accumulated profits for reinvestment.

These taxes include corporation, business, and commodity taxes.

Reduction of Labor Disputes for Foreign Investors
Under the influences of rapid economic growth and inflation,
entrepreneurs encountered rapid increases in wages.

Considering

that the primary asset of the Korean economy is its abundant labor
supply at low wages, some of the recent labor disputes demanding
higher wages could be a problem to foreign investors who have in
vested in Korea in order to utilize the less expensive labor.

In

order to prevent such disputes and provide foreign investors with
favorable labor costs, the Ministry of Economic Planning intends to
regulate labor to resolve disputes.

17

^^The Dong-A Daily, September 3, 1969, P» 2.
^^The Dong-A Daily, November 24, 1969, P* 2.
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Reduction of Foreign Exchange Waste
Foreign capital has helped Korea attain a high rate of economic
growth.

However, there may be a balauice of payments problem after

1971 when the repayment of principal and interest on foreign loans
begins.

Due to the facilities established with foreign capital,

exports have increased every year during recent years, but such a
large quantity of raw materials is imported that the net receipt
from export is very little.

Therefore, the government has to re

consider rapid economic growth attained through high rates of
investment, import, and consumption.
In order to control foreign capital at the proper level on a
more steady basis, the Ministry of the Economic Planning Board pre
pared a Plain for Improving the Administration of Foreign Capital
Inducement.

Foreign capital is allowed to be imported according

to a yearly quota based on the Third Five-Year Economic Develop
ment Plan eind the plan's total capital budget.

Also, standards

such as check lists provided by the International Bank for Recon
struction and Development amd the Agency for International
Development for qualified projects were established to tighten
controls on attracting foreign capital.

18

Strict quotas will be

assigned to short-term commercial loams which affect the international balemce of payments.

19

The National Assembly may revise the Foreign Capital Induce
ment Law to prevent disorders caused by commercial loams.
18

If the

The Dong-A Daiily. January 21, 1970, p. 2.

^ ^The Dong-A Daily, February 11, 1970, p. 2.
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law is passed, all commercial loans for projects over $10 million
in the aresis of fertilizer, electric power, cement, iron and steel,
shipbuilding, petroleum, electronic appliance and machinery indus
tries must receive approval from the National Assembly.
The government has established the Third Secretarial Office
and delegated the authority to handle foreign investments.

The

application for introducing foreign capital should seek approval
from the Office of the President on recommendation from the Third
Secretarial Office, in addition to the approvsil by the Foreign
Capital Inducement Deliberation Committee.

21

Recognizing the necessity of improving management of some en
terprises, the Third Secretarial Office closed the firms or
amalgamated them with other companies.

Firms would be closed or

consolidated if they;
1.

Discontinued or slowed down production because of over

production caused by foreign investments
2.

Had long delays in construction or completion of facilities

because of insufficient capital
5.

Accumulated deferred payments over $355»333

4.

A bank which guarguiteed a loan had to repay the principal

and interest for the indebted company, or such payments were ex
pected.
5*

Accumulated losses for more than two fiscal years.

22

^^The Dong-A Daily. June 20, 1969, P* 2.
^^The Dong-A Daiily, September 3, 1969, P- 2.

22

Ibid.
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Restricting Unfavorable Foreign Capital
As described earlier in the paper, the terms sought by foreign
investors are getting more unfavorable for Koreans each year.

With

some administrative backing, the government has tried to improve
this situation through the following measures:
1.

The Economic Planning Board Ministry has decreed that

foreign capital lenders should consult with governmental agencies
about the terms of capital and should seek advice sind cooperation
from consulate generals in the investing country before commencing
23
negotiations.
2.

The government has introduced a subletting system to util

ize line credits or blainket loans issued through foreign under
writers for loans of less thsui $500,000 per project.

The government

expects to take advantage of economies of scale by combining in
dividual negotiations on those projects requiring less than

$500,000.^^
5.

To date, foreign capital has been imported mainly from the

United States and Japan, but a new source is the Euro-Bond market.
By diversifying capital sources, more favorable terms can be ob
tained while reducing the dependency for capital from just one or
two c o u n t r i e s . A n o t h e r reason for the action is that favorable
capital is more difficult to attract from the United States and

^^Composit Managerial Economics Institution, Managerial Eco
nomics. February, 1968, p. 51•
^^Economic Prospect and Problems in New Year, January, 1968,
p. 222.
^^Foreign Exchange Bank of Korea, Monthly Review, October,
1 9 6 7 , Vol. 1, No. 5* p. 24.
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Japan since they have reached their investing limits.

2é

Finally,

the economic recession within the United States has slowed invest
ments.
4.
country.

Importing technology is very important to a developing
However, in some cases, pseudo-technology has been im

ported under the disguise of technical development.

A technical

assistance agreement is generally entered into, in this case, for
its demonstration effect alone.

These contracts are made not to

develop local technological capacities but rather to import raw
materials, goods-in-process, or to assemble goods prohibited from
27

import.

An application for a technical contract is not approved

if it is considered to be for any of these purposes.

Also, an

application must not contain any conditions that restrict ex
porting products produced with imported technology or dealing with
competitive products that sure produced by the contracted technology.

28

3.

An objective of Americsm investors in Korea is to increase

their profits by utilizing less expensive labor and a favorable
investment environment.

The objectives of Japanese investors are

to increase the Koresms' propensity to consume; increase the de
pendency on the Japanese economy for consumer goods, raw materials,
smd facilities; and create a sales decline in domestic consumer
26

Economic Movement in I968 and the Prospect of the New Year,
December, 1968, p. l44.
^^Korea Exchange Bamk, Weekly Review, April 28, 1969, Vol. 3,
No. 1 7 , p. 2 5 .
pO
Korea Exchange Bank, Consultant, May, 1969» Vol. 3» No. 3,
p. 9 .
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goods industries.

Because of these objectives, the government has

strictly regulated all Japanese investments.

By the end of March,

1 9 6 9 , Japanese investments accounted for 17 loans or 14.5 percent
of the total of 117 loans, whereas American investments consisted
of 57 loans or 48.7 percent of the total.

Considering the amount

of investment, the United States businessmen had Invested about 67
percent while Japan accounted for only 7.2 p e r c e n t . C o n s i d e r i n g
geographic proximity of Korea to Japan and the similarities of
their social and economic systems, the Japanese have potential
profitable opportunities for investing in Korea.

However, they

seldom get such chances due to administrative controls which dis
courage Japanese investment.

Taxes for Interest Equalization
Interest rates on foreign loans range from 6 percent to 8 per
cent but domestic interest rates axe in the 22.8 percent to 31.2
percent per annum range.

31

To prevent undue financial risks, the

government established am "Interest Equalization Tax" which is
effective for five years and applicable to commercial and cash
loans.

The difference in interest between domestic loans and foreign

loans will be absorbed by this tax.
percent of the difference.

The rate is to be set at 30

32

29

Report on R e s e ^ c h on the Actual Condition of Foreign Invested
Enterprises, Mscr, 1969, p. 1 8 , Table 8.
^°Ibid.. p. 1 9 .
^^Korean Reconstruction Bank, Industry Financing Bond, August,
1 9 6 9 , and Korea Exchange Bank, Guide to Deposit, December, 1 9 6 9 .
^^The Dong-A Dsu.ly, April I6 , 1970, p. 2.
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The preceding chapters have presented a history of how one
Asian country has structured its economic development within a
framework of a constantly changing international business environ
ment.

The purpose of this investigation has been to give the

potential foreign investor some insight as to why Korea should be
considered as a repository for his capital.

Only through an un

derstanding of how the Korean government’s development philosophy
has fluctuated in reaction to economic trends can a foreign in
vestor make such important decisions with a minimum of risk and a
maximum return on his capiteil invested.
The evolution of Korea from a war-ravaged and divided nation
into a member of the international business community has not been
an easy transition.

It heis, rather, been the result of extensive

government planning and unilateral intervention into what would
have been normal economic relationships between Korea and poten
tial investors throughout the free world.
ning was nonexistent.

In the beginning, plan

United States foreign aid was responsible

for a steady, if not dramatic, increase in economic growth and
personal income.

When foreign aid was reduced, the dream of

"natural” growth was shattered, and key government officials were
forced to make serious pleuining efforts aimed at generating national
capital from other sources.
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Realizing that it could no longer rely on a self-generated
national product based on injections of foreign siid, the govern
ment turned its attention to foreign investors.

This interest was

manifested in a series of five-yeair plans designed to attract in
dustry which would, in turn, provide a base from which an orderly
economy could develop.
It became readily apparent that any long-range planning efforts
would have to be flexible enough to react to changing economic con
ditions both in Korea and around the world.

In fact, this element

of instability beceuae a key ingredient in the measures adopted with
the first five-year plan.

Laws amd regulations were prepared which

provided foreign investors with preferential treatment not avail
able in many nations; laws included guarantees against capital
confiscation, low interest loams backed by the faith and credit
of the Korean government, and the opportunity for repatriation of
investments.

While such measures did stimulate the flow of exchange

into national accounts, they also carried with them a risk of ex
ploitation through their liberail approach to investment.

A small

amount of "unwanted" industry was tolerated in these early stages
of development; however, as foreign holdings grew, planners gained
the confidence and experience to build a degree of selectivity into
subsequent import guidelines.

Regulations were formulated which

required that all investments be carefully screened emd assessed
as to their potential effects, both social and economic.

This se

lectivity has progressed over the duration of the current fiveyear plan to the extent that in order for an investor in 1971 to
receive favorable treatment afforded him in I 96I, he must be able
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to convince administration officials that his long-rainge objectives
involve capital accumulation, permanent industrialization, and in
tensive use of Korean labor.
As Korea moves into its third five-yeeur plan scheduled to be
gin in 1972, it appears that nationeuL priorities are turning inward
toward the enhancement of the nation's social and cultural environ
ment.

This emphasis is demonstrated in proposals for improvements

in transportation, housing, and utilities.

All such investments

in social overhead capital add to the attractiveness of Korea to
foreign investors, but in addition, the years from 1972 through
1977 will also see the development of Korea as a market for in
dustry ais well as merely a point of manufacture for export.

With

this added dimension, future studies such as this will deal with
the Korean investment climate in a much different msmner.
Aside from the capital import and GKP data presented in the
body of this paper, the ideal conclusion to a study of the Korean
government's efforts to attract foreign capital would be to examine
the role of such investment in Korea today.

The mere fact that

such major companies as International Business Machines, Motorola,
Fairchild, and Gulf have established themselves in Korea is testi
mony to the effectiveness of the government's inducement efforts.
An even more critical consideration, however, is how potential in
vestors view the country.

Temporary success is meaningless unless

obstacles to investment can be identified and overcome.

Such am

assessment of investor's views was outlined in the surveys reported
previously.
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Many of the problems noted by investors are being acted upon
at the present time, such as shortages of raw materials, high
utility expenses, and transportation difficulties.

Others, in

cluding high tax and interest rates, eire inherent to the country's
current economic status and, as such, are more difficult to correct.
The shortage of technical knowledge found by some investors should
end as more technicians teach their skills to Korean nationals and
eus the educational system in Korea becomes more sophisticated.
Problems which the surveys show to arise out of the Korean
government's administration of capital import regulations may con
tinue well into the third five-year plein.

Such obstacles as com

plicated procedures, discourteous officials, and ambiguous regulation
terminology are the by-products of a growing bureaucracy which shows
no signs of abatement.

It can only be hoped that a more educated

electorate will eventually provide a stable political framework
wherein an effective import policy for foreign investment may
operate without unnecessary red tape.
For all the problems experienced by investors, the general
picture appears to be one of increasing optimism.

The investment

environment and the attitudes of the Korean people toward investors
sure viewed as generally favorable.

The availability of abundant

skilled labor at low prices is and will continue to be a major ad
vantage in competing for international investment dollars.

On the

whole, it would seem that government efforts at attracting and con
trolling the import of foreign capital has succeeded in making
Korea's presence felt within the international business community «
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